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HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION BY REGIONAL
ACTORS IN INTERNAL CONFLICTS:




Since the end of the cold war it appears that customary international
law1 has taken a normative legal shift from traditional prohibitions against
forcible intervention in the internal affairs of states, toward the recognition
of a right to humanitarian intervention 2 by groups of states and regional ac-
tors3 in internal conflicts.4 Although a role for regional organizations in hu-
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author would like to thank the attendees at both presentations for their insightful com-
ments. The author would also like to thank Christopher Greenwood and James Mayall
for commenting on earlier drafts of this article. However, any shortcomings are those of
the author.
1. Customary international law can be defined as: "[a] general and consistent practice
of states followed by them from a sense of legal obligation." RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 102 (2) (1987); Moreover, to ascertain customary interna-
tional law, judges resort to "the customs and usages of civilized nations, and, as evidence
of these, to the works of jurists and commentators ...." The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S.
677, 700, 20 S.Ct. 290, 299, 44 L.Ed. 320 (1900).
2. Humanitarian intervention has been defined as: "[T]he justifiable use of force for
the purpose of protecting the inhabitants of another state from treatment so arbitrarily
and persistently abusive as to exceed the limits within which the sovereign is presumed to
act with reason and justice." ELLERY C. STOWELL, INTERNATIONAL LAW: A
RESTATEMENT OF PRINCIPLES IN CONFORMITY WITH ACTUAL PRACTICE 349 (1931);
For an admirable delineation of the history of humanitarian intervention, see generally
FERNANDO R. TESON, HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION: AN INQUIRY INTO LAW AND
MORALITY (1996).
3. A regional actor may be defined as any regional organization, agency, entity or
arrangement made up of and empowered by states to represent their interests, whether
economic, political, military, social, cultural or religious.
4. For an exemplary article discussing U.N. action in Iraq, Somalia, Haiti, Rwanda
and Bosnia, arguing that "international law today recognizes, as a matter of practice, the
legitimacy of collective forcible humanitarian intervention - of military measures author-
ized by the Security Council for the purpose of remedying serious human rights viola-
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manitarian intervention has been established, until the advent of the Eco-
nomic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) missions in Liberia
and Sierra Leone,5 states' practices suggested that prior approval by the Se-
curity Council was a prerequisite to any humanitarian intervention.6 How-
ever, for the first time the ECOWAS Cease-fire Monitoring Group
(ECOMOG) missions in Liberia and Sierra Leone provide two clear exam-
ples of unilateral humanitarian intervention by a regional actor that enjoyed
support from the whole of the international community.7 Likewise, for the
first time there exists contemporary examples of popular humanitarian in-
terventions that have derived their legal basis from customary international
tions," see Fernando R. Tes6n, Collective Humanitarian Intervention, 17 MICH. J. INT'L. L.
323, 324 (1996). See also Captain Davis L. Brown II, USAF, The Role Of Regional Or-
ganizations In Stopping Civil Wars, 41 A.F.L. REV. 235, (1997) (citing David Wippman,
Enforcing the Peace: ECOWAS and the Liberian Civil War, in ENFORCING RESTRAINT:
COLLECTIVE INTERVENTION IN INTERNAL CONFLICTS 191, 157-207 (Lori Fisler Dam-
rosch, ed., 1993) ("as regional conflicts proliferate, pressure is likely to build on regional
organizations to assist or even to supplant the United Nations in handling at least some of
these crisis.")); W. Michael Reisman, Humanitarian Intervention and Fledgling Democra-
cies, 18 FORDHAM INT'L. L.J. 794 (1995); Richard Falk, The Complexities of Humanitarian
Intervention: A New World Order Challenge, 17 MICH. J. INT'L L. 491,503-04 (1996).
5. ECOWAS was established under the Treaty of Lagos in 1975. ECOWAS Execu-
tive Secretariat, Abuja, Nigeria, Treaty of the Economic Community of West African States
(ECOWAS), 28 May 1975. See Wippman, supra note 4, at 154. ECOWAS has taken en-
forcement action in both Liberia and Sierra Leone through its "Cease-firing Monitoring
Group," commonly referred to as ECOMOG. See id. at 177. For those who are skeptical
as to whether ECOWAS is a regional actor (agency or arrangement) as enumerated under
Chapter VIII Article 53 of the U.N. Charter, see S.C. Res. 1132, U.N. SCOR, 3822th mtg.,
U.N.Doc. S/RES/1132 (1997), which calls for a petroleum and arms embargo against Si-
erra Leone, and states, "[aicting also under Chapter VIII of the Charter of the United Na-
tions, authorizes ECOWAS ... to ensure strict implementation of the provisions of this
resolution ... by halting inward maritime shipping in order to inspect and verify cargoes
and destinations ...." Id. If ECOWAS were not recognized as a "regional agency or ar-
rangement," the U.N. would not have authorized it to take enforcement action in Liberia
and Sierra Leone under Chapter VIII of the U.N. Charter. Hence, if the U.N. recognizes
ECOWAS as a "regional actor," arguments to the contrary would appear moot. See Mi-
chael Akehurst, Enforcement Action Regional Agencies, with Special Reference to the Or-
ganization of American States. 42 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L. L. 175, 177-83 (1967) (discussing what
constitutes a regional agency). Akehurst reports that "[tihe relationship between the
United Nations and regional arrangements was second only to the question of voting pro-
cedure in the Security Council as a source of bitter argument at the San Francisco Confer-
ence, which indeed at one time came close to breaking up over regional arrangements."
Id. at 175.
6. See Brown, supra note 4, at 275.
7. The U.N. Security Council legitimized the legality of both ECOWAS interventions
by adopting resolutions under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter that made mandatory pre-
vious ECOWAS embargoes - the Security Council sanctioned petroleum and arms embar-
goes against both Liberia (see S.C. Res. 788, U.N. SCOR, 3138th mtg., U.N.Doc.
S/RES/788 (1992)) and Sierra Leone (see S.C. Res. 1132, U.N. SCOR, 3822th mtg.,
U.N.Doc. S/RES/1132 (1997)). Further, under S.C. Res. 866, for the first time the U.N. co-
deployed forces with an organization (ECOMOG-Liberia) that was already operational.
See S.C. Res. 866, U.N. SCOR, 3281st mtg., U.N.Doc. S/RES/866 (1993).
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law, rather than the U.N. Charter. The ECOWAS interventions in Liberia
and Sierra Leone, and the Inter-African Mission to Monitor the Implemen-
tation of the Bangui Agreements (MISAB) in the Central African Republic
(CAR) are cases in point. 9 As a result, the customary international law doc-
trine of humanitarian intervention seems to have been "revived.'.
For purposes of this article, "humanitarian intervention" can be taken
to mean: Intervention in a state involving the use of force (U.N. action in
Iraq and Somalia or ECOWAS action in Liberia and Sierra Leone) or threat
of force (U.N. action in Haiti), where the intervenor deploys armed forces
and, at the least, makes clear that it is willing to use force if its operation is
resisted - as it attempts to alleviate conditions in which a substantial part of
the population of a state is threatened with death or suffering on a grand
scale."
Presently, customary international law appears to recognize four excep-
tions to the principle of non-intervention in the domestic or internal affairs
of states: (1) when a de jure government requests or consents to intervention;
(2) when a group of states or a regional actor invokes a right to humanitarian
intervention; (3) when a state acts in self-defense; and (4) counter-
intervention by a state to offset an illegal prior intervention by another
state .
Moreover, in consonance with the above exceptions, international law
8. See Report of the Secretary General Pursuant To Resolution 1136 (1997) Concern-
ing The Situation In the Central African Republic, 53rd. sess., U.N. SCOR, U.N. Doc.
S/1998/61 (1998).
9. See id. On January 31, 1997, the Heads of State of Gabon, Burkina Faso, Chad and
Mali established MISAB to restore "peace and security in the Central African Republic
by monitoring the implementation of the Bangui Agreements and conducting operations
to disarm the former rebels, the militia and all other unlawfully armed persons." Id. Ac-
cording to the United Nations, on February 8, 1997, "MISAB was deployed in Bangui,
comprising a total of some 800 troops from Burkina Faso, Chad, Gabon and Mali; and
later from Senegal and Togo, under the military command of Gabon and with logistical
and financial support of France." Id.
10. Yet, many commentators remain steadfast in their non-interventionist trenches,
maintaining that international law does not recognize any right to humanitarian interven-
tion. See L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW § 134, at 305 (Lauterpacht ed. 8th ed.
1955); see also Ulrich Beyerlin, Humanitarian Intervention, in 3 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 211, 212 (Rudolf Dolzer et al., eds. 1982). Other commen-
tators argue that at the very most, enforcement action may only be taken under the
authority of the United Nations. See generally, R. Higgins, Peace and Security Achieve-
ments and Failures, 6 EUR. J. INT'L L. 445 (1995); John Quigley, The "Privatization" of
Security Council Enforcement Action: Threat to Multilateralism, 17 MICH. J. INT'L. L. 249,
249-50 (1995-96).
11. See Christopher Greenwood, Is there a right to humanitarian intervention?, 49
THE WORLD TODAY 34 (1993).
12. See David Wippman, Change Continuity in Legal Justifications for Military Inter-
vention in Internal Conflicts, 27 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REv. 425,446 (1995-96). However,
Wippman states that some of these justifications, at least in particular applications, are not
without controversy. See id.
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seems to recognize the following four types of intervention: (1) unilateral in-
tervention by a state or group of states acting on their own initiative (United
States and allies in Iraq, MISAB in the CAR and Nigeria in Sierra Leone);
(2) unilateral intervention by a regional actor acting on its own initiative
(ECOWAS in Liberia and Sierra Leone); (3) intervention authorized by the
United Nations but not taken by it (United States in Somalia and Haiti, and
France and Senegal in Rwanda); and (4) intervention taken by the United
Nations (Liberia, Yugoslavia and the CAR). The foregoing article is primar-
ily concerned with unilateral intervention as described in (2) above. But, in
an attempt to determine when the international community condones hu-
manitarian intervention, reference will be made to the other types of inter-
vention.
The legal basis for unilateral intervention is different from an interven-
tion taken under the authority of the United Nations. On this point Christo-
pher Greenwood comments:
Intervention might be the unilateral action of a state or group of al-
lies or an operation conducted under the authority of the United
Nations. But the legal issues would be different. United Nations in-
tervention would have to be based on powers conferred by the
U.N. Charter, whereas any right of unilateral intervention could
only be derived from customary international law.
13
Specifically, it may be said that an intervention which falls under either
(1) or (2) above derives its legal basis from customary international law,
whereas an intervention under (3) and (4) derives its basis from Chapter VII
of the U.N. Charter.
This article concludes that today customary international law seems to
provide for an exception to the international law prohibition against unilat-
eral intervention in the domestic or internal affairs of states.' The interna-
tional community seems to be witnessing the initial stages of a shift in the
law de lege ferenda, and sanctioning unilateral humanitarian intervention by
groups of states or regional actors in internal conflicts. 5 The law de lege lata
appears to permit unilateral humanitarian intervention by groups of states or
regional actors in three instances: (1) when there are human rights abuses
within a state that are so egregious as to violate the jus cogens norms of in-
ternational law;16 (2) when a state has collapsed and is withering into a state
13. Greenwood, supra note 11, at 34.
14. See Report on U.N. Decade of International Law, G.A. Res. 50, U.N. GAOR, 15th
Sess., U.N. Doc. A/368 (1995). The resolution calls on member states to promote accep-
tance of and respect for the principles of international law, and encourage its progressive
development.
15. Unilateral humanitarian intervention can be taken to mean humanitarian inter-
vention by a group of states or regional actor which has its legal basis in customary inter-
national law rather than the U.N. Charter. The term de lege ferenda is "the law as it may
be, or should be, in the future" and the term de lege lata is "the law as it currently stands."
16. A jus cogens norm, also known as a "peremptory norm" of international law "is a
norm accepted and recognized by the international community of states as a whole as a
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of anarchy;17 and (3) to safeguard democracy when a democratic government
has been violently and illegally dislodged against the will of its domestic
population."8 The above should be viewed as the normative criteria on which
humanitarian intervention should be based.' 9 Within this context, it is impor-
norm from which no derogation is permitted and from which can be modified only by a
subsequent norm of general character." Vienna Convention of the Law of Treaties, May
23, 1969, Art. 53, 1155 U.N.T.S, 332, 344; Klock v. Cain, 813 F. Supp. 1430, 1433 n.8 (C.D.
Cal. 1993) (adopting Vienna Convention's definition of jus cogens). Further, "sitting atop
the hierarchy of international law, jus cogens norms enjoy the greatest clout, preempting
both conflicting treaties and customary international law." W. D. Verwey, Humanitarian
Intervention under International Law, 32 NETH. INT'L L. REV. 357, 418 (1985); see Ved P.
Nanda, Tragedies in Northern Iraq, Liberia, Yugoslavia, and Haiti-Revisiting the Validity
of Humanitarian Intervention Under International Law, 20 DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 305,
310 (1992); Prinz v. Federal Republic of Germany, 26 F. 3d 1166, 1179 (D.C. Cir. 1994);
United States v. Alfried Krupp, reprinted in 10 TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE
NUREMBERG MILITARY TRIBUNAL UNDER CONTROL COUNCIL LAW 1395 (1950). In
this context, the Nuremberg Trials made clear that "'to prepare, incite, or wage war of ag-
gression ... to persecute, oppress, or do violence to individuals or minorities on political,
racial, or religious grounds in connection with such war, or to exterminate, enslave, or de-
port civilian populations, is an international crime."' Prinz, 26 F. 3d at 1174 (quoting R.
Jackson, Final Report to the President on the Nuremberg Trials (Oct. 7, 1946), cited in R.
JACKSON, THE NUREMBERG CASE XIV-XV (1971) (emphasis added)). Thus, with regard
to the criteria mentioned above, humanitarian intervention should be legally justified
when groups of states or regional actors attempt to stop or prevent a state from violating
the jus cogens norms as proscribed by Nuremberg. In such cases, states should be ex-
pected to fulfill their obligations erga omnes and intervene. See id.
17. Anarchy has been defined as "having no ruler ... absence of government ... a
state of lawlessness or political disorder due to the absence of governmental authority."
WEBSTER'S NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 83 (9th ed.1988). Accordingly, the character
of the state during the conflicts in Rwanda, Somalia and Liberia epitomize this definition.
Although some commentators have referred to such states as failed states, the author be-
lieves that collapsed states is the more accurate term. The former signifies a permanent
state of being whereas the latter signals a temporary state. See Brown, supra note 4, at 272-
73.
18. See generally, Lois Fielding, Taking the next Step in the Development of the New
Human Rights: The Emerging Right of Humanitarian Intervention Assistance to Restore
Democracy, 5 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 329 (1995). In this instance, collective forcible
intervention may be meant to avert deadly conflict (Haiti and Sierra Leone), or restore
democracy in a "collapsed state" (Somalia). The United Nations' threat of force against
the junta in Haiti may have prevented violent conflict between pro-Aristide supporters
and the military junta. Similarly, ECOMOG action in Sierra Leone appears to have pre-
vented internal deadly conflict between the civilian population and military junta. Never-
theless, it can be argued that this criterion falls outside the scope of humanitarian inter-
vention, and may be better associated with the doctrine of self-determination. However,
the humanitarian crises that stem from such circumstances propels it into the humanitarian
intervention theatre. See Reisman, supra note 4, at 794.
19. These criteria are only concerned with the "substantive basis" justifying "entry"
into a sovereign state. For other sources enumerating substantive and "procedural" crite-
ria, see Richard B. Lillich, Humanitarian Intervention: A Reply to Ian Brownlie and a Plea
for Constructive Alternatives, in LAW AND CIVIL WAR IN THE MODERN WORLD 229, 248
(John Norton Moore ed. 1974); Richard B. Lillich, Forcible Self-Help by States to Protect
Human Rights, 53 IOWA L. REV. 325, 346-51 (1967); Richard B. Lillich Intervention to
Protect Human Rights, 15 MCGILL L.J. 204, 218 (1969); John Norton Moore, The Control
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tant to note that these criteria should be seen as specific guidelines rather
than rigid rules and, as the cases of Sierra Leone and the CAR demonstrate,
current trends in international law and U.N. practice would seem to allow for
some flexibility.
This notion is supported by: (1) the United Nations' and states' un-
precedented action20 and support for the ECOWAS "peace enforcement ac-
tivities" in Liberia and presently Sierra Leone;2 and (2) recent and bold
Chapter VII action taken by the Security Council with regard to Iraq, 3 So-
malia,' Yugoslavia,2n Rwanda,26 Haiti, 7 and the CAR.' In order to demon-
of Foreign Intervention in Internal Conflict, 9 VA. J. INT'L L. 205, 264 (1969); Hungdah
Chiu, Communist China's Attitude toward the United Nation: A Legal Analysis, 62 AM. J.
INT'L L. 20,39-40 (1968).
20. U.N. support for ECOWAS' peace enforcement activities in Liberia is best illus-
trated in Security Council Resolution 866, which states "that this would be the first peace-
keeping mission undertaken by the United Nations in cooperation with a peace-keeping
mission already set up by another organization, in this case" (emphasis added). S.C. Res.
866, U.N. SCOR, 3281st mtg., U.N.Doc. S/RES/866 (1993). The resolution established the
United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia (UNOMIL), which co-deployed with
ECOMOG.
21. According to Akehurst:
The distinction between U.N. 'enforcement action' and 'peacekeeping' has increas-
ingly become blurred, due to new kinds of operations (often labeled 'second genera-
tion peacekeeping' or 'mixed peacekeeping' which may include some enforcement
elements). Indeed, the terminology concerning U.N. peacekeeping has recently be-
come rather confusing.
AKEHURST'S MODERN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 416, (Peter Malanczuk
ed., 1997).
Henceforth, for purposes of this article, "peace enforcement" means proportionate forci-
ble military action, through deployment of forces, to threaten or engage an individual,
group, entity or government, to comply with lawful directives as proscribed by interna-
tional law.
22. Chapter VII Article 39 action refers to "[a]ction with respect to threats to the
peace, breaches of the peace, and acts of aggression." U.N. CHARTER art. 39. para. 1. Ar-
guably, the Security Council authorized Chapter VII Article 42 action to varying degrees
in each case mentioned below. See infra notes 22-27.
23. See S.C. Res. 678., U.N. SCOR, 2963rd. mtg., U.N.Doc. S/RES/678 (1990)
(authorizing collective forcible military intervention to propel Iraqi forces from Kuwait);
See also S.C. Res. 688, U.N. SCOR, 2982nd mtg., U.N.Doc. S/RES/688 (1991) (calling for
an end to Iraqi repression, and insisting that Iraq "allow immediate access by international
humanitarian organizations" to provide relief.).
24. See S.C. Res. 767, U.N. SCOR, 3101st. mtg., U.N.Doc. S/RES/767 (1992) (decid-
ing that "the situation in Somalia constitutes a threat to international peace and secu-
rity."); See also S.C. Res. 794, U.N. SCOR, 3145th mtg., U.N.Doc. S/RES/794 (1992)
(authorizing a U.S.-led military force to "use all necessary means to establish as soon as
possible a secure environment for humanitarian relief operations in Somalia.").
25. See S.C. Res. 770, U.N. SCOR, 3106th mtg., U.N.Doc. S/RES/770 (1992) (em-
powering states "to take nationally or through regional agencies or arrangements all
measures necessary to facilitate in coordination with the U.N. the delivery.. .of humani-
tarian assistance ... in ... Bosnia-Herzegovina."); see also S.C.Res 816, U.N. SCOR,
3191st. mtg., U.N.Doc. S/RES/816 (1993) (authorizing member states to take "all neces-
sary measures in the airspace of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, in the event of
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strate when the international community appears to support unilateral hu-
manitarian intervention, the above cases will be discussed; the ECOWAS-
Liberian intervention will be discussed in Part II, the United Nations and
MISAB interventions in Part III, and the Nigeria and ECOWAS interven-
tions in Sierra Leone in Part IV.
Since ECOWAS is comprised of sixteen sovereign states, and the
ECOMOG operations in Liberia and Sierra Leone were supported by the
majority of independent states, 9 it can be said that the interventions were
supported by the opinio juris and practice of states. It is the practice of states
that create international law. While international organizations such as the
United Nations may influence international law, only states may bring it into
being. States' practice only exists when there is a consistent pattern of com-
monality in action among them. For example, both Togo's contribution of
forces, and the United States' and Britain's moral and financial support for
ECOMOG may demonstrate such a pattern.
I. INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ASPECTS OF HUMANITARIAN
INTERVENTION
There is a general consensus among scholars that "international law has
further violation to ensure compliance with the ban on flights.") This resolution author-
ized the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) to commence air strikes against
Bosnian Serb positions. See id.
26. See S.C. Res. 929, U.N. SCOR, 3392nd. mtg., U.N.Doc. S/RES/929 (1994)
(authorizing France to "use all necessary means" to protect and provide humanitarian re-
lief to Rwandan civilians).
27. See S.C Res. 875, U.N. SCOR, 3293rd mtg., U.N.Doc. S/RES/875 (1993) (author-
izing member states to take military action to enforce sanctions.); see also S.C. Res. 940,
U.N. SCOR, 3413th mtg., U.N.Doc.S/RES/940 (1994) (empowering member states "to
form a multinational force ... [and] ... use all necessary means to facilitate the departure
from Haiti of the military leadership.").
28. See S.C. Res. 1125, U.N. SCOR, 3808th mtg., U.N.Doc. S/RES/1125 (1997)
(authorizing member states participating in MISAB to "ensure the security and freedom
of movement of their personnel."); see also S.C. Res. 1159, U.N. SCOR, 3867th mtg.,
U.N.Doc.S/RES/1159 (1998) (establishing a United Nations Mission in the Central Afri-
can Republic (MINURCA) to primarily assist in maintaining peace, security, stability, law
and order, and protecting key installations in Bangui. This marks the second time that the
U.N. has co-deployed a peace-keeping force with an operation already underway, Liberia
being the first.).
29. Support for ECOWAS was and is evidenced by the actions of independent states,
and states action through the United Nations. Interview with Dr. Simon D. Harkin, Head
of Pan-African Policy and Resources Staff - British Foreign and Commonwealth Office
(June 1998); see also U.S. Department of State Office of the Spokesman Press Statement,
Press Statement by James Foley, Deputy Spokesman, July 24, 1997; see generally, Regina C.
Brown, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, Is There Still a Foreign
Policy of the U.S. Toward Africa?, at the 39th International Seminar for Diplomats, Sal-
zburg, Austria (Aug. 2, 1996).
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long treated internal conflict as a matter of domestic jurisdiction, to be de-
cided solely by the people of the affected state in keeping with their right to
order their own affairs as they see fit. '30 Thus, international law does not
prohibit revolution, civil war or civil strife, i.e. rebellion,31  nor does it
authorize them, as there is no legal right of rebellion. It is simply a liberty.
Stated differently, international law is neutral on the issue.
"Foreign intervention in internal conflicts is more the rule than the ex-
ception. 3 2 The ECOWAS, U.N., MISAB and Nigerian interventions re-
ferred to above evidence this position, demarcating a normative legal shift
toward international recognition of a right to unilateral humanitarian inter-
vention by regional actors in internal conflicts.
A. Humanitarian Intervention
The international community seems to agree that states should not be
allowed to hide behind the cloak of "sovereignty" or "domestic jurisdiction"
when committing grave human rights violations. Further, it seems to con-
done intervention to avert anarchy when a state has collapsed, or safeguard
democracy when a de jure government has been violently and illegally dis-
lodged against the volition of its domestic population. In these circum-
stances, the international community appears to support humanitarian inter-
vention. Certainly, U.N. action since 1990 supports this notion. For example,
the United Nations Security Council "has authorized military intervention to
end repression of the Kurds in Iraq, famine in Somalia, ethnic cleansing in
Bosnia, and genocide in Rwanda. Even the overthrow of the democratic
government of Haiti sufficed to prompt the Security Council to authorize
military intervention. 3 3 In light of the above, Tes6n argues:
[I]international law today recognizes, as a matter of practice, the
legitimacy of collective forcible humanitarian intervention of mili-
tary measures authorized by the Security Council for the purpose of
remedying serious human rights violations. While traditionally the
only ground for collective military action has been the need to re-
spond to breaches of the peace, especially aggression, the interna-
tional community now has accepted a norm that allows collective
humanitarian intervention to respond to serious human rights
abuses.'4
It is debatable whether the international community has accepted a
"[norm] that allows for collective humanitarian intervention to alleviate seri-
30. Wippman, supra note 12, at 435. See U.N. CHARTER, art. 2(4).
31. See Wippman, supra note 12, at 435; see also Oscar Schachter, International Law:
The Right of States to Use Armed Force, 82 MICH. L. REv. 1620, 1641 (1984).
32. Wippman, supra note 12, at 436.
33. Id. at 462-63 (emphasis added).
34. Tes6n, supra note 4, at 324.
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ous human rights abuses., 31 What one country views as "serious" another
may not; thus in the legal sense, such a standard is far too ambiguous. In
this context, humanitarian intervention should only be justified when re-
sponding to human rights abuses that are so grave that they violate the jus
cogens norms of international law (to persecute, oppress, exterminate, en-
slave or deport civilian populations).
In the Barcelona Traction case in 1970, the International Court of Jus-
tice stated that certain basic human rights, such as the protection from geno-
cide, slavery and racial discrimination, are obligations erga omnes.36 In addi-
tion, referring to Article 19 of the International Law Commission's U.N.
Draft Articles on State Responsibility, "a serious breach on a widespread
scale of the international obligations of essential importance for safeguard-
ing the human being, such as those prohibiting slavery, genocide and apart-
heid," is an "international crime."37 Likewise, the works of the Nuremberg,
Yugoslavian and Rwandan Tribunals evidence that these criteria have been
accepted as non-derogable norms of international law.
Further, consistent with ECOWAS action in Liberia and Sierra Leone,
MISAB action in the CAR, and U.N. action in Liberia, Somalia, Yugoslavia,
Rwanda, Haiti and the CAR, today, when a government collapses or has
been violently and illegally dislodged against the will of its domestic popula-
tion, the international community seems to have accepted a norm that per-
mits unilateral humanitarian intervention to forestall grave human rights
abuses, to avert a state's descent into anarchy, and to safeguard democracy.
II. ECOWAS AND HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION: THE CASE
OF LIBERIA
Any contemporary discussion regarding the validity or existence of the
customary international law doctrine of humanitarian intervention requires a
discussion of the quintessential case of Liberia. The ECOMOG mission in
Liberia marks the first time the international community as a whole has sup-
ported unilateral humanitarian intervention by a group of states (regional
actors) in a purely domestic conflict.
The following sections will provide the historical events which led to the
ECOWAS-ECOMOG intervention in 1991; discuss the legality of interven-
tion by ECOWAS-ECOMOG under international law; and determine
whether ECOWAS was entitled to invoke a right to humanitarian interven-
tion.
35. Id. (emphasis added).
36. See Barcelona Traction Case (Belgium v. Spain), 1970 I.C.J. Rep. 3 para. 33-34
(Second Phase).
37. AKEHURST, supra note 20, at 59-60.
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A. Background
In 1980, Master Sergeant Samuel Kanyon Doe led a successful coup
d'etat38 that ended over 153 years of Americo-Liberian rule. Initially, Doe
appeared to have the support of the majority of Liberia's domestic popula-
tion, who saw him as an agent for progressive change. After taking power,
he promised Liberians that a new constitution would be implemented in
1986, ending rule by martial law.39 However, Doe failed to keep his promise,
resulting in mass political unrest.
Like most military dictators, Doe was ill-equipped to be head of state.
He was an army staff sergeant, not a politician. Not surprisingly, during
Doe's reign, the political and economic infrastructure of Liberia rapidly de-
cayed. By 1989, political unrest matured into civil insurrection, leading to an
eight-year civil war.'
The Liberian Civil War began in 1989, when Charles Taylor," Liberia's
current President,42 and a group of so-called "dissidents" launched a small
scale attack on security personnel in Nimba County (located on the Libe-
rian-C6te d'Ivoire border), and advanced toward the capital city of Mon-
rovia.4 '3 The group led by Taylor came to be known as the National Patriotic
Front of Liberia (NPLF). The NPLF grew quickly, as politically disillu-
sioned members of the Mano and Gio ethnic groups joined." Doe's Ameri-
can-backed regime, known for its violent and repressive military tactics, was
crushed by NPLF fighters. As a result, by May 1990, Taylor's NPLF con-
trolled more territory in Liberia than Doe's regime, with the exception of
38. Doe belonged to the Khran ethnic group.
39. Doe relied heavily on Khran support to keep himself in power. He noticeably fa-
vored his group, giving them the majority of government posts.
40. By 1996, it is estimated that over 200,000 people perished during the war, leaving
1.2 million people internally displaced. Moreover, it is estimated that over 750,000 people
fled the country. Given that Liberia's prewar population was approximately 2.8 million,
14% perished. Comparatively, this would be similar to 37 million American citizens dying.
U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, Country Re-
port on Human Rights Practices for 1996 (1997).
41. Former Liberian Director-General of the General Services Agency (GSA) under
Doe's regime who, after having been charged with embezzlement in Liberia, fled to the
U.S., only to be arrested in Massachusetts. While awaiting extradition to Liberia, he es-
caped from jail. See Interview by Baffour Ankomah, Chief Editor of New African; see
also Interview with Charles Taylor, President of Liberia, in Gbarnga, Liberia, 1-17 (July
30, 1992).
42. President Charles Taylor was inaugurated on August 2, 1997. See Final Report of
the Secretary-General On The United Nations Observer Mission In Liberia, 52nd sess.,
U.N. SCOR, S/1997/712 (1997).
43. See BBC Monitoring Report, 4 January 1990, Liberia: Curfew in Nimba County
Following Alleged Coup, 2 January 1990, reprinted in 6 REGIONAL PEACE-KEEPING AND
INTERNATIONAL ENFORCEMENT: THE LIBERIAN CRISIS 32-33 (M. Weller, ed.) (1994).
[hereinafter THE LIBERIAN CRISIS].
44. See THE LIBERIAN CRISIS, supra note 43, at xix. Taylor's NPLF included mem-
bers from the majority of Liberia's ethnic groups.
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Monrovia.45 Around this time, one of Taylor's senior commanders, Prince
Yormie Johnson, broke from the NPLF and formed his own group, the In-
dependent National Patriotic Front of Liberia (INPFL). The INPFL seem-
ingly had no concrete objective other than to wage war against the NPLF
and the Government of Liberia. Johnson's split from Taylor was only a mi-
nor setback for the NPLF, which continued its campaign.
Doe's American-backed army suffered large losses, as it was defeated in
nearly every engagement. Doe, facing certain defeat, made unsuccessful ap-
peals for assistance to the people of Liberia and the U.S. Government. Dis-
gruntled and impaired by the collapse of his government, Doe appealed to
ECOWAS to introduce a "[p]eace-keeping force into Liberia to forestall in-
creasing terror and tension .... "46
Since ECOWAS and the Organization of African Unity (OAU) were
not able to mediate a peaceful end to the conflict,47 on August 7, 1990, the
ECOWAS Standing Mediation Committee decided to establish an
ECOWAS Cease-fire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) for Liberia.48
ECOWAS created ECOMOG to halt the "wanton destruction of human life
and property ... [and] ... massive damage ... being caused by the armed
conflict to the stability and survival of the entire Liberian nation." '9
ECOMOG was mandated to "restor[e] law and order to create the necessary
conditions for free and fair elections .... "'o On August 27, 1990, ECOMOG
forces landed in Liberia and immediately came under attack by NPLF
forces." In response, ECOMOG forces "fought back with mortars, artillery
and automatic weapons."52
On August 29, 1990, in an attempt to end pandemonium in Liberia, par-
ticipants at the National Conference of All Liberian Political Parties, Patri-
otic Fronts, Interest Groups and Concerned Citizens in Banjul, Gambia cre-
ated an Interim Government of Liberia and elected Dr. Amos Sawyer as
45. Monrovia is the capital of Liberia. It was named after U.S. President James
Monroe.
46. Letter addressed by President Samuel K. Doe to the Chairman and Members of the
Ministerial Meeting of the ECOWAS Standing Mediation Committee, 14 July 1990, re-
printed in THE LIBERIAN CRISIS, supra note 43, at 60.
47. See THE LIBERIAN CRISIS, supra note 43, at 38-39, 57-59, 63, 65 (providing ex-
amples of these failed efforts).
48. See ECOWAS Standing Mediation Committee, Decision A/DEC.1/8/90, on the
Cease-fire and Establishment of an ECOWAS Cease-fire Monitoring Group for Liberia,
Banjul, Republic of Gambia, 7 August 1990, reprinted in THE LIBERIAN CRISIS, supra
note 43, at 67, 71. The ECOWAS Standing Mediation Committee included representatives
from the Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Mali and Togo.
49. Id. at 67.
50. Id. at 68.
51. See BBC Monitoring Report, 27 August 1990, Report: ECOMOG Force Lands;
Met by Prince Johnson; Clash with NPLF, 24 August 1990, reprinted in THE LIBERIAN
CRISIS, supra note 43, at 87.
52. Id.
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Interim President." Participants at the conference stated that they created
the new government because of the "total breakdown of law and order, the
prevailing state of war, the massive loss of life, the displacement of the citi-
zens, and the collapse of the government of President Samuel K. Doe."'
5
Charles Taylor's NPLF refused to attend the Banjul Conference, and
did not recognize the Interim Government." On September 9, 1990, ap-
proximately one week after the "Peace Conference," Prince Johnson's guer-
rillas ambushed and kidnapped Doe at the ECOWAS headquarters in Mon-
rovia, and murdered him at the NPLF's Caldwell Base in the Barclay
center. .56
B. ECOWAS-ECOMOG and the Legality of Intervention
This section will discuss the legality of the ECOWAS intervention in
Liberia. Specifically, it will concentrate on the validity of the intervention
under customary international law and the post de jure authentication of the
operation by the United Nations Security Council.
If it can be shown that ECOWAS' "purpose" for intervention was to
support Doe's regime, the intervention would be deemed illegal under cus-
53. See Interim Government of National Unity of Liberia, Final Communiqug of the
National Conference of All Liberian Parties, Patriotic Fronts, Interest Groups and Con-
cerned Citizens, Banjul, Republic of Gambia, 29 August 1990, reprinted in THE LIBERIAN
CRISIS, supra note 43, at 89. However, it cannot be said that the "interim government" was
the de jure government of Liberia because the "de facto" ruler of Liberia (Charles Taylor)
did not recognize the "new government," and at this juncture, nor did the international
community. Moreover, Taylor did not allow the interim government to function as a cen-
tral authority. See United States State Department, Regular Briefing by Richard Boucher,
11 September, 1990, reprinted in THE LIBERIAN CRISIS, supra note 43, at 95; Report: Tay-
lor Condemns "Foreign Mercenaries"; Banjul Decision on Interim Rule, 2 September, 1990,
reprinted in THE LIBERIAN CRISIS, supra note 43, at 94.
54. Interim Government of National Unity of Liberia, Final Communiqug of the Na-
tional Conference of All Liberian Parties, Patriotic Fronts, Interest Groups and Concerned
Citizens, Banjul, Republic of Gambia, 29 August 1990, reprinted in THE LIBERIAN CRISIS,
supra note 43, at 89. The Conference participants were as follows: the Liberia Action
Party, Liberian People's Party, Unity Party, United Peoples Party, Liberia Unification
Party, National Democratic Party of Liberia, Independent National Patriotic Front of Li-
beria, Liberian Professional Business Association, Press Union of Liberia, Bong County
Associations in the Americas, Union of Liberian Artists and Concerned Women of Libe-
ria, Higher Education Association, United Nimba Citizens Council, Association for Con-
stitutional Democracy in Liberia, Concerned Citizens, Front for Popular Democracy and
Inter-Faith Mediation Committee of Liberia. See id.
55. See BBC Monitoring Report, 31 August 1990, Taylor Refuses to Attend Banjul
Meeting; Johnson Delegation, 29 August 1990, reprinted in THE LIBERIAN CRISIS supra
note, 43 at 88, 95.
56. See BBC Monitoring Report, 11 September 1990, Report: President Samuel Doe
Wounded and Captured by Prince Johnson's Forces 9 September 1990, reprinted in THE
LIBERIAN CRISIS, supra note 43, at 97; BBC Monitoring Report, 13 September 1990, Re-
port: Reaction to Reported Death of President Doe, 11 September 1990, reprinted in THE
LIBERIAN CRISIS, supra note 43, at 98.
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tomary international law." Under international law, regional actors are lim-
ited, as they may not possess any powers beyond those of their member
states. Hence, a regional actor may not intervene in any conflict that its
member states would be forbidden to enter. On this point Oscar Schachter
remarks,
[n]o state today would deny the basic principle that the people of a
nation have the right, under international law, to decide for them-
selves what kind of government they want, and that this includes
the right to revolt and to carry on armed conflict between compet-
ing groups. For a foreign state [or regional actor] to support, with
Force one side or the other in an internal conflict, is to deprive the
people in some measure of the right to decide the issue by them-
selves. It is, in terms of article 2(4), a use of force against the politi-
cal independence of the state engaged in civil war.5 8
Presently, there is little evidence to show that ECOWAS "intended" to
militarily support Doe's "regime."5 9 Had the ECOWAS leadership wanted
to kill Taylor, there was ample opportunity. Unlike Western advisors in the
Congo, ECOMOG activities in Liberia seemed legitimate. 60 Perhaps, the fact
that Charles Taylor is currently President of Liberia best evidences this as-
sertion. Hence, arguing that the ECOWAS intervention was credible and
objective, Wippman states:
Nigeria did not simply impose its will on Liberia. It did not inter-
vene unilaterally, or at a point when Doe's regime might still have
been salvageable. More importantly, Nigeria has frequently had to
compromise on ECOMOG's goals and tactics in order to maintain
a consensus within ECOWAS for continued involvement within
Liberia. But for this need to compromise, ECOMOG might well
have overrun Taylor's forces in August 1990. Indeed, many of the
fits and starts of the ECOWAS approach to Liberia - the on again,
off again economic sanctions and the repeated efforts to accommo-
date Taylor despite his string of broken promises - demonstrate
that ECOMOG had indeed been a Community enterprise.61
Once the situation in Liberia deteriorated to a point where mediation
efforts were fruitless, "[s]enior Liberian politicians and interests groups ...
openly called for U.S. marines to stop the fighting,, 62 however, it was to no
57. See Richard A. Falk, International law and the United States Role in the Vietnam
War, 75 YALE L. J. 1122, 1127 (1966).
58. Schachter, supra note 31, at 1641.
59. See Wippman, supra note 4, at 192. However, it is true that between 1989-90, "Ni-
geria" (not ECOWAS) provided political, economic and military supplies to Doe's re-
gime.
60. See id.
61. Id. (emphasis added). Perchance, Nigeria's commitment to consensus can serve as
an example for other countries, specifically the United States, who over time have demon-
strated an uncanny ability to repudiate the will of the international community by taking
unilateral enforcement action.
62. Id. at 164-65.
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avail.63 The United States viewed the Liberian conflict as an internal affair,
to be solved by Liberians themselves. ' Certainly, the United States did not
use an internal affairs test when it intervened in the internal conflicts in the
Philippines, Nicaragua, Panama, Iraq, Yugoslavia, Somalia and Haiti, albeit
the latter two with U.N. authorization. Apparently, Liberia's foreign policy
stock devalued in the post-Cold War era. Yet, according to Herman J.
Cohen, former U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, between
1980 and 1990, Doe's regime received $67 million in military assistance from
the U.S. government, not including an estimated $1.5 million for the fiscal
year 1991. 6'
Initially, like the United States, the United Nations did not intervene in
the Liberian conflict. Wippman states that this was partly due to opposition
by C6te d'Ivoire, which was sympathetic to Taylor, and Ethiopia and Zaire,
which did not want to set an "intrusive" precedent.6 As history has shown,
had the West favored intervention, those in opposition would have submit-
ted. Only after the United States denied assistance and the United Nations
failed to respond in a timely fashion did ECOWAS take it upon itself to in-
tervene.67
Humanitarian justifications aside, nowhere in the U.N. Charter does it
state that a regional agency may forcibly intervene in an internal conflict if
the United Nations does not. 6' According to Chapter VIII Article 53 of the
U.N. Charter, "no enforcement action shall be taken under regional ar-
rangements or by regional agencies without authorization of the Security
Council ...., Clearly, ECOWAS did not obtain authorization from the
United Nations before it intervened in Liberia.70  Therefore, unless
ECOWAS could justify intervention on some other legal basis, the interven-
tion would appear to have been unlawful.
In order for a regional actor to take military enforcement action, it must
be empowered to do so by its organizing instrument or subsequent protocol
or treaty.71 The ECOWAS Treaty of 1975 did not provide for a regional se-
curity mechanism to deal with "purely" internal conflicts.72 Moreover, nei-
63. However, the U.S. did evacuate American and foreign personnel from Liberia.
See BBC Monitoring Report, 31 July 1990, reprinted in THE LIBERIAN CRISIS, supra note
43, at 63; BBC Monitoring Report, 5 August 1990 reprinted in THE LIBERIAN CRISIS, supra
note 43, at 65; BBC Monitoring Report, 20 August 1990 reprinted in THE LIBERIAN
CRISIS, supra note 43, at 85.
64. See Statement of Hon. Herman J. Cohen, Assistant Secretary of State, Bureau of
African Affairs, reprinted in THE LIBERIAN CRISIS, supra note 43, at 46.
65. See id. at 48-49.
66. See Wippman, supra note 4, at 165.
67. See id. at 165.
68. See U.N. CHARTER, supra note 22.
69. Id. art. 53, para. 1, at 26.
70. See id.
71. See id.
72. See generally THE LIBERIAN CRISIS, supra note 43.
[Vol. 12.2
1998] HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION BY REGIONAL ACTORS 347
ther the ECOWAS Protocol on Non-Aggression, 7 nor the ECOWAS Proto-
col relating to Mutual Assistance on Defense,7 empowers ECOWAS to take
enforcement action in purely internal conflicts (conflicts which do not enjoy
external assistance). Therefore, unless it can be shown that ECOWAS val-
idly invoked a right to humanitarian intervention, the intervention must be
deemed unlawful, since there appears to have been no legal basis for the in-
tervention under international law.
Although there was no legal basis for the ECOWAS intervention under
the U.N. Charter, it was supported by the United Nations and the whole of
the international community. In fact, "[bjetween 22 January 1991 and 27
November 1996, the Council adopted fifteen resolutions directly relating to
the situation in Liberia, in addition, the President of the Security Council is-
sued nine statements in this connection."75 In virtually every resolution and
statement, the United Nations commended ECOWAS for its efforts, not
once making reference to ECOMOG's "offensive" use of force; in effect,
this tacitly legitimized such force. On November 19, 1992, the Security
Council adopted Resolution 788, calling for a complete weapons embargo
against Liberia. The embargo did not apply to ECOWAS. Ten months
later, on September 22, 1993, the Security Council adopted Resolution 866
which called for the creation of the United Nations Observer Mission in Li-
beria (UNOMIL), and stated "that this would be the first peace-keeping
mission undertaken by the United Nations in cooperation with a peace-
keeping mission already set up by another organization, in this case
ECOWAS. ''76 Hence, it can be said that Resolutions 788 and 866 placed a
retroactive de jure seal on the ECOWAS intervention.
C. ECOWAS-ECOMOG and "Humanitarian Intervention"
This section will discuss the relevant substantive legal issues which arise
when examining the legality of external intervention by states in the domes-
73. See ECOWAS Protocol on Non-Aggression, 22 April 1978, reprinted in THE
LIBERIAN CRISIS, supra note 43, at 18 (calling on member states to "refrain from commit-
ting, encouraging or.condoning acts of subversion, hostility or aggression against ... other
Member States." Also calls on member states to prevent foreigners and non-resident for-
eigners from committing or using member state territory to commit acts of aggression
against the sovereignty of Community Members. Likewise, it states that disputes which
can not be settled peacefully should be referred to the authority of heads of state and gov-
ernment.)
74. See ECOWAS Protocol Relating to Mutual Assistance on Defence, 29 May 1981,
reprinted in THE LIBERIAN CRISIS, supra note 43, at 19. The Protocol calls on Member
States to give mutual aid and assistance for defense against armed threat or aggression,
and that any armed threat or aggression against any member is one against the entire
Community. Moreover, it states that, internal armed conflict in any state supported by
outside forces, likely to endanger security and peace in the community, will be dealt with
by the authority of the member states concerned.
75. The United Nations and the Situation in Liberia, U.N.Doc. [ST/] DPI/1668, 52nd
sess., at 35 (1997).
76. Id. at 41.
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tic conflicts of other states.
On July 14, 1990, in a letter to the Chairman of the Ministerial Meeting
of the ECOWAS Standing Mediation Committee, Doe suggested that "it
would seem most expedient at this time to introduce an ECOWAS Peace-
keeping Force into Liberia to forestall increasing terror and tension and to
assure a peaceful transitional environment.",77 On its face, Doe's letter ap-
pears to have been a valid request by a de jure government for assistance,
justifying the introduction of a peace-keeping force by ECOWAS in Liberia.
Unfortunately, the situation was not that simple. By the time Doe requested
ECOWAS assistance, his government had collapsed. With the exception of
Monrovia, the NPLF controlled nearly all of Liberia.7' Foreign governments,
news agencies, and apparently Doe himself seemed convinced that Taylor's
NPLF would inevitably win the war, 9 and by July 14, 1990, it was clear that
he had. Only ECOWAS and the Organization of African Unity negotiation
attempts forestalled a final NPLF assault on Monrovia.
Since Doe was no longer considered the legitimate head of state by the
Liberian people, ° and considering that the government itself had collapsed, 81
can it really be said that Doe possessed the legal authority to request assis-
tance on behalf of the Republic of Liberia? The answer is no. Under inter-
national law, if a de jure government loses de facto control of the state, until
it regains control, it forfeits its autonomous legal standing. 2 On this issue,
Louise Doswald-Beck comments,
that a regime may only be legally entitled to invite outside military
help if it is a government within the meaning of the international
law, and must therefore be in de facto control. If, on the other hand,
it needs to request assistance to quell an insurrection, i.e. a rebel-
77. Letter addressed by President Samuel K Doe to the Chairman and Members of the
Ministerial Meeting of the ECOWAS Standing Mediation Committee, 14 July 1990, re-
printed in THE LIBERIAN CRISIS, supra note 43, at 60. (emphasis added).
78. Doe's forces were outnumbered at least five to one. By July 1990, it was estimated
that Doe had only 1000 troops, all of which were stationed in Monrovia for a final stand
off with NPLF forces. See U.S. House of Representatives, Subcommittee on Africa of the
Committee on Foreign Affairs, 101st Congress, 2nd Session, Hearing on U.S. Policy and the
Crisis in Liberia, 26 June 1990, reprinted in THE LIBERIAN CRISIS, supra note 43, at 47.
79. See id. at 43-55.
80. See BBC Monitoring Report: 26 June 1990, Liberian Demonstrators and Opposi-
tion Parties Say Doe Must Go, reprinted in THE LIBERIAN CRISIS, supra note 43, at 57.
81. See Wippman, supra note 4, at 182 (stating that then Organization of African
Unity Chairman, President Musevini of Uganda, and President Mugabe of Zimbabwe an-
nounced that the Government of Liberia had collapsed). Furthermore, if Doe's regime
was still operable, why did participants at the "National Conference of All Liberian Politi-
cal Parties, Patriotic Fronts, Interest Groups and Concerned Citizens," declare that there
"[was] no government in Liberia?" Interim Government of National Unity of Liberia, Final
Communique of the National Conference of All Liberian Political Parties, Patriotic Fronts,
Interest Groups and Concerned Citizens, 19 August 1990, reprinted in THE LIBERIAN
CRISIS, supra note 43, at 89 (emphasis added).
82. See Louise Doswald-Beck, The Legal Validity of Military Intervention by Invita-
tion of the Government, 1985 BRIT. Y. B. INT'L L. 189, 195-96 (1985).
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lion of some magnitude, it is by definition not in de facto control
and thus cannot speak for the state.
Hence, as Taylor's forces took control of "greater" Liberia, Doe's gov-
ernment and military crumbled, in effect making Taylor the only de facto
ruler. As a result, no individual had legal standing to represent the state as a
whole. Nevertheless, according to Doswald-Beck, the "existence of de facto
control is generally the most important criterion in dealing with a regime as
representing the state." That being the case, in order for the ECOMOG
operation to have qualified as a lawful "peace-keeping" mission, ECOWAS
would have needed to obtain Taylor's consent prior to intervention. Moreo-
ver, despite claims to the contrary, Sawyer could not have consented to in-
tervention because he was not elected interim president of Liberia until five
days after the intervention took place. Furthermore, the interim government
was not created until August 29, 1990, approximately one week before the
death of Doe. Therefore, Sawyer did not possess the legal authority to
authorize intervention, as Doe was still considered the de jure Head of State.
By July 1990, Doe's regime had completely collapsed. By late August
1990, Liberia seems to have had three leaders, as Taylor, Doe, and Sawyer
claimed to be head of state. Still, Doe's regime would have to be considered
more legally valid than Sawyer's new government. Sawyer's interim govern-
ment lacked de jure status for four primary reasons: (1) Doe was still alive;
(2) at this stage, Sawyer's interim government did not control any territory in
Liberia; (3) the interim government was not yet recognized by the interna-
tional community, and (4) it is unclear whether the election of the interim
government was lawful under the Constitution of the Republic of Liberia.
Surely, in the legal sense, referring to the Banjul Conference, political
acquiescence by various political entities and elites would not suffice to cre-
ate a de jure government. Nor would it negate claims by Taylor (the de facto
ruler) to be President of Liberia." By late July 1990, since Taylor was the
only de facto ruler, he appears to have been the only domestic authority enti-
tled to authorize intervention. At the very least, ECOWAS needed to ob-
tain Taylor's consent prior to intervention. It is a well established fact that it
did not.
Under international law, a government may request foreign assistance
to thwart internal disorder or restore rule. However, as previously stated,
international law does not permit intervention to quash civil war. Once con-
flict has exploded into violent civil war, foreign intervention on behalf of ei-
ther party is illegal.8 Thus, in the Liberian case, if it can be shown that inter-
83. Id.
84. Id. at 194.
85. Due to the vast amount of territory that Taylor controlled, he appeared to be the
only de facto leader. By 27 July 1990 Taylor "claimed" to be the President of Liberia. See
BBC Monitoring Report: Doe Government "Dissolved;" Charles Taylor Leads New Gov-
ernment, 30 July 1990, reprinted in THE LIBERIAN CRISIS, supra note 43, at 62-63.
86. See Falk, supra note 57, at 1127; see also Schachter, supra note 31, at 1641-45.
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vention was based solely on Doe's consent, the intervention would have to
be deemed illegal, since it would have assisted Doe and averted the NPLF's
(Liberian people's) right to self-determination.' Nonetheless, there does not
appear to be any substantive evidence showing that ECOWAS relied on
Doe's letter as a basis for intervention, or that ECOWAS intervened to sup-
port Doe's regime. Likewise, not one decision or resolution of the
ECOWAS Standing Mediation Committee makes mention of Doe's letter."
This suggests that Doe's request was a minor factor in the ECOWAS deci-
sion to intervene.
Although intervention appears to have been based on humanitarian
grounds, ECOWAS leaders were keenly aware that peace would have to be
obtained by force.89  Upon landing in Liberia, on August 24, 1990,
ECOMOG troops came under fierce attack by NPLF forces.90 In self-
defense, ECOMOG forces retaliated with "mortars, artillery and automatic
weapons."9' By September 17, 1990, approximately one week after the assas-
sination of Doe, fighting escalated between the NPLF, the IPLF and
ECOMOG. In an attempt to prevent Taylor from taking Monrovia,
ECOMOG launched offensive missile attacks by land and air against the
NPLF.93 At times, ECOMOG seemed less like a "peace-making force" and
more like an unintended party to the conflict. Notwithstanding, ECOMOG
action must be viewed in light of its mandate to stop the war and restore law
and order.
ECOWAS seems to have validly invoked a right to humanitarian inter-
vention because the de jure government of Liberia collapsed, causing the
state to slide into anarchy, which resulted in death and suffering on a grand
scale. Moreover, the intervention marked the first time that unilateral hu-
87. See Schachter, supra note 31, at 1641-42.
88. On the contrary, the ECOWAS Standing Mediation Committee Decision
A/DEC.1/8/90, states purely humanitarian reasons for establishing ECOMOG. ECOWAS
Standing Mediation Committee Decision A/DEC.1/8/90, on the Cease-fire and Establish-
ment of an ECOWAS Cease-fire Monitoring Group for Liberia, Banjul, Republic of Gam-
bia, reprinted in THE LIBERIAN CRISIS, supra note 43, at 67; see ECOWAS Standing Me-
diation Committee, Banjul, Republic of Gambia, Final Communique of the First Session, 7
August 1990, reprinted in THE LIBERIAN CRISIS, supra note 43, at 73 (justifying the estab-
lishment of ECOMOG on humanitarian grounds.).
89. See Wippman, supra note 4, at 167.
90. See BBC Monitoring Report, 27 August 1990, Report: ECOMOG Force Lands;
Met by Prince Johnson; Clash with NPLF, 24 August 1990, reprinted in THE LIBERIAN
CRISIS, supra note 43, at 87.
91. Id. Such humanitarian actions are hardly of your peace-keeping variety.
92. See BBC Monitoring Report, 18 September 1990, Report: ECOMOG on Offensive
Against Taylor reprinted in THE LIBERIAN CRISIS, supra note 43, at 99; "Violent Fighting"
in Monrovia, 16 Sept. 1990, reprinted in THE LIBERIAN CRISIS, supra note 43, at 99.
93. See BBC Monitoring Report, 19 September 1990, Report: Military Solution Sought;
Nigeria, Ghana to Send ECOMOG Reinforcements 17 September 1990, reprinted in THE
LIBERIAN CRISIS, supra note 43, at 99. ECOMOG intensified its peace-enforcement ac-
tivities after Doe's death. See id.
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manitarian intervention by a group of states (regional actors) in a purely in-
ternal matter was supported by the whole of the international community,
and the first time the United Nations co-deployed with another organization
already in the field.94 Commenting on the ECOWAS intervention, Wippman
remarks, "[tihe legitimacy of humanitarian intervention under international
law is, of course, much debated. But for those who believe it is or should be
considered lawful, the ECOWAS intervention in Liberia satisfies virtually
every proposed test, and in many respects constitutes an excellent model." 95
In retrospect, considering the international community's response to the
MISAB intervention in the CAR, and the ECOWAS mission in Sierra Le-
one, it may also be the case that the Liberian intervention generated instant
customary international law or "diritto spontaneo," namely, that unilateral
humanitarian intervention by groups of states in domestic conflicts is law-
ful.96
III. THE UNITED NATIONS AND HUMANITARIAN
INTERVENTION IN IRAQ, SOMALIA, YUGOSLAVIA, RWANDA
HAITI AND THE CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC: EXPANDING
THE CRITERIA FOR INTERVENTION?
Since 1990,9 the United Nations has engaged in more peace-keeping ac-
tivities than at any other time in the organization's history.98 Although the
following case studies derive their legal basis from the U.N. Charter and not
customary international law,99 they sequentially demarcate new trends in in-
ternational law and U.N. practice. Furthermore, all six interventions oc-
curred during the Liberian Civil War and prior to the ECOWAS interven-
tion in Sierra Leone. In order to properly assess new trends which have
developed with regard to the validity of forcible military intervention in
states for humanitarian ends, it is necessary to examine the following case
studies chronologically (Iraq 1991, Somalia 1992, Yugoslavia 1992, Rwanda
1993, Haiti 1993, and the CAR 1997). These cases offer valuable insight into
when the international community is willing to condone the puncturing of
94. See S.C. Res. 866, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess. para. 5, U.N. Doc. S/INF/49 (1993).
95. Wippman, supra note 4, at 179.
96. See North Sea Continental Shelf Cases (FRG v. Denmark and IRC v. Nether-
lands), 1969 I.C.J. Rep. at 3, 4; Bin Cheng, United Nations Resolutions on Outer Space:
"Instant" International Customary Law?, 5 INDIAN J. INT'L L. 23 (1965); P. Malanczuk,
Space Law as a Branch of International Law, 25 NETH. INT'L L. REV. 143, 160-61 (1994).
97. Ironically, during the eight year (1989-1997) civil war in Liberia, the United Na-
tions engaged in "peace-enforcement" activities in Iraq, Somalia, Yugoslavia, Rwanda and
Haiti.
98. The character and nature of such missions have also changed. The United Nations
appears more willing to use "force" as a means to obtain compliance with its mandates.
99. Except for the CAR which derived its legal basis for customary international law
and the U.N. Charter. The Security Council passed several resolutions with regard to the
CAR crises.
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states' sovereignty for humanitarian ends. As a result, it can be argued that
the Security Council has been used as a mechanism to legitimize humanitar-
ian intervention.
A.Iraq
Two major issues arise with regard to the United States' and coalition
forces' military enforcement action in Iraq under a stretched interpretation
of Security Council Resolution 688. The first issue is whether unilateral mili-
tary action by the United States and allied forces amounted to humanitarian
intervention and the second is whether the Security Council would have
been justified in authorizing the use of force in Iraq.
Whether or not Iraq's ruthless attacks upon its Kurdish people in
Northern Iraq amounted to a breach of the jus cogens norms of international
law as defined by Nuremberg is debatable. If commentators agree that it
was, then perhaps intervention by the United States and coalition forces was
justified on humanitarian grounds. However, this assertion is difficult to
make because the United States, which led the assault, interpreted Security
Council Resolution 688 to authorize it to take military enforcement action.
However, nowhere in the resolution does it authorize the use of force against
Iraq." ° On the contrary, it reaffirms "the commitment of all Member States
to the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of Iraq
and of all States in the area . .. ."'0' Moreover, the resolution "demanded"
and "insisted" that Iraq "immediately end this repression and express[ed]
the hope in the same context that an open dialog [would] take place to en-
sure that the human and political rights of all Iraqi citizens are respected.
1 0 2
This evidences the United Nations' preference for diplomacy over military
force in an attempt to obtain a cessation of Iraqi repression. Even the most
cursory glance at Resolution 688 reveals that intervention by the U.S. and
allied forces was not endorsed by the United Nations.1 °3 Former U.N. Secre-
tary-General Javier Perez de Cuellar asserted that the intervention was le-
gally problematic and therefore disapproved of it.'I° Since the Security
Council did not adopt a resolution authorizing the United States and allied
forces to use force against Iraq, the intervention had no legal basis under the
U.N. Charter and could be seen as a violation of Article 2(4) of the Char-
ter."°0
Although there does not appear to be any legal basis for the interven-
100. See S.C. Res. 688, U.N. SCOR, 2982nd mtg., U.N.Doc. S/RES/688 (1991).
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Secretary-General Javier Perez de Cuellar indicated that intervention was le-
gally problematic, and seemed against intervention. See Stephen Robinson, The Middle
East: Bush and U.N. Chief Clash Over Legality of Military Move, THE DAILY
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tion, the United States and its allies may have been entitled to invoke a right
to humanitarian intervention.' 8 The United States did not obtain Iraq's con-
sent prior to intervention; rather it justified intervention on humanitarian
grounds (namely to avert further human rights violations by Iraq against the
Kurds) and seemingly used proportionate military force to achieve its objec-
tive.1°7 However, at no time did the United States or allied forces claim a
right to humanitarian intervention. Even if they had, as previously stated, it
is questionable whether Iraq's nefarious acts toward the Kurds were egre-
gious enough to justify puncturing its sovereignty. Furthermore, it would be
difficult to classify "unprovoked" air strikes as a form of humanitarian inter-
vention, as the doctrine seems to call for some type of ground presence in
the target state. Therefore, if the United States and allied forces had
claimed a right to humanitarian intervention, their assertion would have ap-
peared insupportable. Perhaps this explains the absence of such a claim.
However, it must be noted that the United States' action in Iraq could
be seen "partly in the special context of post-war actions by victors in the
territory of defeated adversaries."'0 8 However, for this to have been the case,
it must be shown that Iraq breached an agreement which delineated inter-
vention as a consequence of the breach. No such agreement has been cited.
Since there appears to be no consensus as to the legal validity or justifi-
cation for U.S. intervention in Iraq, it would seem unlikely that the U.S.'s
action would set a precedent. On the other hand, in certain instances it may
signify the international community's willingness to condone forcible mili-
tary action by the United Nations or states, even if such action appears to
have no legal basis under the U.N. Charter or customary international law,
regardless of whether a formal attestation to humanitarian intervention has
been made. Or, it may simply be that the international community is not
prepared to hold the Great Powers accountable for acting unlawfully.
Whatever the case may be, U.S. and allied action in Iraq would seem to
qualify as some form of unilateral humanitarian action, not intervention.
B. Somalia
Although U.N. action in Somalia was a clear case of humanitarian inter-
vention, '°9 some commentators disagree with this assertion." ° In essence,
106. See Tes6n, supra note 4, at 343-48.
107. Nevertheless, American conduct in Iraq would seem to qualify as "humanitarian
action," not intervention.
108. Adam Roberts, Humanitarian Action in War: Aid, protection and impartiality in
a policy vacuum, 305 ADELPHI PAPERS 7, 22 (1996).
109. According to Professor James Mayall, "[f]or the first time, statelessness was ac-
knowledged to be a threat to an international society composed of sovereign states."
JAMES MAYALL, THE NEW INTERVENTIONISM 1991-1994 UNITED NATIONS
EXPERIENCE IN CAMBODIA, FORMER YUGOSLAVIA AND SOMALIA 14 (James Mayall &
Joan Lewis, eds.) (1996).
110. See Roberts, supra note 108, at 22.
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they argue that "there was no Somali government to give or refuse consent,
so the intervention by the Unified Task Force (UNITAF) ... and its con-
tinuation by the United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSCOM II) ...
was hardly a classic case of humanitarian intervention. ' 1.. Such an argument
is contradictory. If one accepts the contention that intervention without con-
sent is a decisive criterion for action to qualify as humanitarian intervention,
it would seem illogical to argue that a legal central authority must exist to
not give consent in order for humanitarian intervention to be valid.1 12 If this
were the case, a group of states, a regional actor, or the United Nations
would never be able to legally invoke a right to humanitarian intervention
once a government has collapsed or withered into a state of anarchy. The
Somalia case reveals that when the de jure government of a state dissolves
and nothing takes its place (except wide spread civil war or anarchy), what
exists is a "collapsed state. 1 3 Typically, collapsed states cannot give consent
because such states do not have an operable central authority. Thus, unless
commentators are willing to argue that the existence of a central authority is
an obligatory prerequisite for military intervention in a state to qualify as
humanitarian intervention, arguments which maintain that a government
must exist to give or refuse consent would appear to be fruitless. Moreover,
customary international law does not support such an assertion.
The events in Somalia were unprecedented because "the United Na-
tions Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM I and II) and the United Nations-
sanctioned and United States-led Unified Task Force (UNITAF) repre-
sented one of the rare cases in which an international military force was de-
ployed in large measure to deal with a humanitarian crisis.'. 4 Likewise,
"[t]his was the first time that an unambiguously internal and humanitarian
crisis had been designated as a threat to international peace and security,
thus justifying peace enforcement measures.'. 5 Moreover, another prece-
dential aspect of U.N. action in Somalia was UNOSOM II's broad mandate
111. Id.
112. See U.N. CHARTER, art. 2, para. 7. (stating that the Security Council does not
need consent when it takes enforcement action under Chapter VII of the Charter).
113. See Francis Mading Deng, State Collapse: The Humanitarian Challenge to the
United Nations, in COLLAPSED STATES: THE DISINTEGRATION AND RESTORATION OF
LEGITIMATE AUTHORITY 207 (I. William Zartman, ed., 1995).
114. 3 THE UNITED NATIONS BLUE BOOK SERIES, THE UNITED NATIONS AND
SOMALIA 1992-1996, at 3 (1996). UNOSOM I was created by Security Council Resolution
751 (1992), to monitor the cease-fire in Mogadishu and protect humanitarian workers.
Pursuant to Security Council 794 (1992), the U.S.-led UNITAF was created, authorizing
Member States to use all necessary means to establish a secure environment for humani-
tarian operations. UNOSOM II was created by Security Council Resolution 814 (1993),
which acting pursuant to Resolution 794 (1992), was to replace UNITAF and consolidate,
expand, and maintain a secure environment throughout Somalia. See S.C. Res. 814, U.N.
SCOR, 3188th. mtg., U.N.Doc. S/RES/814 (1993); S.C. Res. 794, U.N. SCOR, 3145th.
mtg., U.N.Doc. S/RES/794(1992).
115. MAYALL, supra note 109, at 94.
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to help the Somalis create democratic institutions, i.e. rebuild their state.
UNOSOM II's broad mandate appears more liberal than Security Council
Resolution 940, calling for the forced removal of Haiti's military junta and
the restoration of democracy.
The case of Somalia evidences that the international community ap-
pears to support unilateral humanitarian intervention by groups of states or
regional actors when states collapse and descend into anarchy due to civil
war.
C. Yugoslavia
The United Nations acted on the request of the Yugoslav government
when it interceded in the former Yugoslavia."7 The character of the forces
deployed comported with that of traditional U.N. peace-keeping missions, as
they were deployed pursuant to a cease-fire and were not mandated to use
force. However, as the conflict escalated, the United Nations seemed willing
to take all necessary measures to bring peace and security to Yugoslavia, in-
cluding an extension and enlargement of the U.N. Protection Force
(UNPROFOR) to insure delivery of humanitarian assistance. 8 In July 1992,
after passing several resolutions condemning Serb aggression, ships from the
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and Western European Union
began monitoring compliance with Security Council Resolution 713 and Se-
curity Council Resolution 757;119 nonetheless Serb hostilities continued un-
abated.
As a result, the Security Council adopted numerous additional resolu-
tions which forestalled Serb aggression and hostility toward Bosnian Mus-
lims and UNPROFOR personnel. According to Captain Davis L. Brown of
the United States Air Force, the resolutions justified NATO air strikes
against Serbian missile sites and ground radars, and at times advancing or
hostile Serbian ground units. NATO flew more than 23,000 sorties in this
regard.1 20 The most notable was Security Council Resolution 836, which ac-
116. See S.C.Res. 814, U.N. SCOR, 3188th. mtg., U.N.Doc. SJRES/814 (1993).
117. See S.C.Res. 721, U.N. SCOR, 3018th mtg., U.N.Doc. S/RES/721 (1991).
118. See S.C.Res. 743, U.N. SCOR, 3055th mtg., U.N.Doc. S/RES/743 (1992) (estab-
lishing and authorizing the deployment of the U.N. Protection Force (UNPROFOR) in
Yugoslavia.); see S.C. Res. 758, U.N. SCOR, 3083rd mtg., U.N.Doc. S/RES/758 (1992);
S.C. Res. 761, U.N. SCOR, 3087th mtg., U.N.Doc. S/RES/761 (1992); S.C. Res. 770, U.N.
SCOR, 3016th mtg., U.N.Doc. S/RES/770 (1992). After the Security Council authorized
the UNPROFOR, it was understood that the United Nations may extend the mandate of
UNPROFOR, with or without the consent of the government. See Roberts, supra note
108, at 22. Subsequent resolutions suggested that if UNPROFOR's humanitarian activities
were interfered with, measures not based on consent of the Yugoslavian government
could be taken to fulfill the United Nations' humanitarian mandate. See id.
119. See Brown, supra note 4, at 260-65 (containing a detailed analysis of NATO ac-
tion in Yugoslavia).
120. See generally S.C. Res. 807, U.N. SCOR, 3174th mtg., U.N.Doc. SJRES/807
(1993); S.C. Res. 824, U.N. SCOR, 3208th. mtg., U.N.Doc. S/RES/824 (1993); S.C. Res.
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cording to Captain Brown, compelled NATO to take "offensive action" in
the form of air strikes against Bosnian Serb headquarters in Pale.'
Hence, similar to the interventions in Iraq and Somalia, U.N. action in
Yugoslavia demonstrates that the international community is willing to con-
done the use of force to prevent mass killing and combat tyranny."
D.Rwanda
U.N. peace-keeping activities in Rwanda date back to October 5, 1993.
2 3
On June 22, 1993, pursuant to requests by both the government of Rwanda
and the Rwandese Patriotic Front, the Security Council adopted Resolution
846, establishing the United Nations Observer Mission Uganda-Rwanda to
monitor the Uganda-Rwanda border and "ensure that no military assistance
reaches Rwanda."'2 4 On August 4, 1993 both factions signed a peace agree-
ment in Arusha, Tanzania. 12 Soon after, the Security Council adopted
Resolution 872, authorizing the establishment of a United Nations Assis-
tance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR), mandated "to maintain security
while the transitional Government [was] being set up .... ,,26 Despite U.N.
efforts, the situation in Rwanda quickly deteriorated, as both sides failed to
abide by the terms of the Arusha Accord, namely the cease-fire. The dete-
riorating situation, taken together with the killings of the presidents of
Rwanda and Burundi,27 set the stage for violence of catastrophic propor-
tions, which lead to the ensuing genocide of Tutsis and moderate Hutus by
Hutu extremists.' 28 In order to avoid further casualties, Belgium withdrew its
836, U.N. SCOR, 3228th mtg., U.N.Doc. S/RES/836 (1993); S.C. Res. 913, U.N. SCOR,
3367th mtg., U.N.Doc. S/RES/913 (1994); S.C. Res. 958, U.N. SCOR, 3461st mtg.,
U.N.Doc. S/RES/958 (1994).
121. See Brown, supra note 4, at 264 (arguing that S.C. Res. 836. para. 9 (1993)
amounted to "a grant of authority to use offensive force.").
122. See id. at 262.
123. However, "serious" ethnic and political conflict between the Rwandan Patriotic
Front and Rwandan Government Forces dates back to at least 1 October 1990. See 3 THE
UNITED NATIONS BLUE BOOK SERIES, THE UNITED NATIONS AND RWANDA 1993-1996,
at 115 (1996). [hereinafter THE UNITED NATIONS AND RWANDA]; see generally GERARD
PRUNIER, THE RWANDA CRISIS HISTORY OF A GENOCIDE (1995) (discussing the civil
war in Rwanda).
124. THE UNITED NATIONS AND RWANDA, supra note 123, at 116.
The mission was set up on the Uganda side of the border.
125. See id. at 116.
126. Id. at 117.
127. On April 6, 1994, while returning from a regional summit in Dares Salaam, both
presidents were killed when their plane was allegedly struck by a land to air missile. As a
result, violence raged throughout the country. Later that day, Rwanda's Prime Minister,
ten Belgium peace-keepers assigned to protect her, and three Hutu opposition party lead-
ers were brutally murdered by Rwandese Government Army soldiers. See id. at 37, 38.
128. Shortly after the plane crashed, members of the Presidential Guard systemati-
cally killed hundreds of Tutsis civilians and suspected Hutu moderates. See id
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UNAMIR peace-keeping contingent and weaponry." 9
Due to the escalation of violence, the Security Council adopted Resolu-
tion 912, which scaled down UNAMIR's presence in Rwanda. 3 Conse-
quently, by the end of April 1994, violence reached profound levels.
"[M]assacres of civilians were continuing everywhere in Rwanda ... with
some reports estimating that as many as 200,000 people had been killed. 131
Likewise, the U.N. reports that there were over 250,000 displaced persons
and approximately 400,000 refugees in Burundi, Uganda, Tanzania and Za-
ire.132 Overwhelmed by the conflict, on May 2, 1994, the Rwandese govern-
ment requested that the Security Council strengthen UNAMIR's presence in
Rwanda. "3 On May 17, 1994, the Security Council authorized UNAMIR II,
which expanded the mission's force to 5500 troops, to provide security to
displaced persons, refugees and civilians.' However, due to a lack of sup-
port and logistical equipment needed to make UNAMIR II fully operational
and timely, the Secretary General suggested that the Security Council con-
sider France's proposal to create a French-led multi-national force:
In these circumstances, the Security Council may wish to consider
the offer of the Government of France to undertake, subject to Se-
curity Council authorization, a French-commanded multinational
operation in conjunction with other Member States, under Chapter
VII of the Charter of the United Nations, to assure the security and
protection of displaced persons and civilians at risk in Rwanda.
Such an operation was one of the options envisaged in my letter of
29 April (S/1994/518) and precedent exists for it in the United
States-led operation Unified Task Force in Somalia (UNITAF)
which was deployed in Somalia in December 1992.135
Furthermore, the Secretary-General advised the Security Council that if
it decided to authorize the plan, member states which have contingents in
UNAMIR would be asked to keep such contingents in Rwanda "until
UNAMIR is brought up to the necessary strength to take over from the mul-
tinational force and the latter has created the conditions in which a peace-
keeping force operating under Chapter VII would have the capacity to carry
out its mandate. 136 Consistent with the French and Senegalese plan, 7 on
129. See id. at 40-41.
130. See id. at 44.
131. Id.
132. See id. at 45.
133. See id. at 274-75.
134. See id. at 282-84.
135. See Letter dated 19 June 1994 from the Secretary-General to the President of the
Security Council, suggesting that the Council consider France's offer to undertake a multi-
national operation to assure the security and protection of civilians at risk in Rwanda until
UNAMIR is brought to strength, in THE UNITED NATIONS AND RWANDA, supra note 123,
at 306.
136. Id.
137. See Letter dated 20 June 1994 from the Permanent Representative of France to the
United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General, requesting adoption of a resolution un-
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June 22, 1994 the Security Council adopted Resolution 929.138 The resolution
is an exemplary illustration of humanitarian intervention authorized by the
United Nations. On July 18, 1994, after winning the war, the Rwandese Pa-
triotic Force unilaterally declared a cease-fire ending the civil war.3 9
International responses to the tragic events in Rwanda were poor and
shameful. If there was any lesson learned from the case of Rwanda, it is that
states are reluctant to put their own national contingents at risk when there
is no overwhelming national interest.' 4° Nevertheless, U.N. action in Rwanda
was still a clear case of humanitarian intervention, as it showed the United
Nations' willingness to intervene in internal conflicts to avert genocide.
Moreover, it appears that the Security Council may have intended to set a
precedent in Somalia and Rwanda and, as a result, will undoubtedly turn to
states and regional actors to assist in the maintenance of international peace
and security in the future.
E.Haiti
The case of Haiti should be viewed in light of the previously examined
interventions. The Security Council has authorized states to halt genocide
(Yugoslavia and Rwanda), restore law and order to collapsed states (Soma-
lia and Liberia), protect humanitarian workers and civilians (the Central Af-
rican Republic and Iraq) and restore democratic institutions (Somalia).
Hence, it should come as no surprise that it would also seek to "safeguard"
democratic institutions, the absence of which gives rise to violent conflict.
The Haiti intervention was important because it signified the interna-
tional community's willingness to defend democratic institutions14 by insur-
ing that democracy prevails in states which have been shaken by violent, ille-
gal and unpopular coups (i.e., those which do not enjoy support from the
civilian populace).
On December 16, 1990, Jean-Bertrand Aristide was elected President of
Haiti. The election was deemed valid and democratic by the Organization of
American States, the United Nations and the Caribbean Community.' 42
der Chapter VII of the Charter as a legal framework for the deployment of a multinational
force to maintain a presence in Rwanda until the expanded UNAMIR is deployed, in THE
UNITED NATIONS AND RWANDA, supra note 123, at 307.
138. See id. at 308-09.
139. See id. at 57.
140. This assertion is particularly true regarding Western States. See UNITED STATES
DEPARTMENT OF STATE, CLINTON ADMINISTRATION POLICY ON REFORMING
MULTILATERAL PEACE OPERATIONS (1994). Unlike the United States in Somalia and
Belgium in Rwanda, no ECOWAS member state withdrew peacekeepers after sustaining
causalities in Liberia. More West African peace-keepers died in Liberia than Western
peace-keepers in Somalia and Rwanda combined. In this sense, ECOWAS has illustrated
that it is willing to make great sacrifices to bring about peace in West Africa.
141. In this context, democratic institutions are those which enjoy unimpeded support
from the bulk of a state's populace.
142. See United Nations and the Situation in Liberia, supra note 75.
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On September 30, 1991, Lieutenant-General Raoul Cedras led a suc-
cessful coup d'etdt, sending President Aristide into exile. Immediately, the
Organization of American States' Ministers of Foreign Affairs condemned
the coup d'etdt and adopted two resolutions to that effect, urging "OAS
member States to freeze the financial assets of the Haitian State and impose
a trade embargo on Haiti . .. .,14' According to Tes6n, the Security Council
was initially reluctant to intervene as it deemed the situation in Haiti to be a
purely internal matter.1" Nevertheless, the Organization of American States
succeeded in putting the matter on the Security Council agenda. In 1993, the
Organization's actions having failed to restore democracy to Haiti, the Secu-
rity Council made mandatory the Organization's-recommended trade em-
bargo under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter by adopting Security Council
Resolution 841.14' Since the embargo did not sway the military junta, the Se-
curity Council boldly adopted Resolution 940, which determined "that the
situation in Haiti continue[d] to constitute a threat to peace and security in
the region.., and [a]cting under Chapter VII of the Charter... authorize[d]
Member States to form a multinational force ... to use all necessary means
to facilitate the departure from Haiti of the military leadership."146 This was
the first time the Security Council authorized military force to remove a de
facto government from power, and the first time a group of states were
authorized to restore democracy as opposed to law and order."
In order to avoid a U.S.-led "peace invasion," the military junta "agreed
to resign when a general amnesty would be voted into law by the Haitian
Parliament, or by 15 October 1994, which ever was earlier."'14 By October
10th, with peace looming, the twenty-eight-nation multi-national force, con-
sisting of 21,000 troops, began to scale down. Soon after, the United Nations
Mission for Haiti (UNMIH) replaced the multinational force and assisted
the de jure government to restore democracy.
U.N. intervention in Haiti represents a unique case, as there was never a
genuine threat to international peace and security.149 The military junta did
143. Id.; see Brown, supra note 4, at 355 n.120.
144. See Tes6n, supra note 4, at 355.
145. President Aristide requested that the United Nations deploy a monitoring group
in Haiti. Further, the Permanent Representative of Haiti requested that the President of
the Security Council make the Organization of American States' trade embargo manda-
tory. See United Nations and the Situation in Liberia, supra note 75, at 3; S.C. Res. 841,
U.N. SCOR, 3238th mtg., U.N.Doc. S/RES/841 (1993).
146. S.C. Res. 940, U.N. SCOR, 3413rd mtg., U.N.Doc. S/RES/940 (1994). In prac-
tice, the American-brokered Security Council resolution mirrored a typical John Wayne
movie with its "get out before sundown or else" proclamation.
147. See id. Although as previously stated, it can be argued that the United Nations
attempted to "create democracy" in Somalia.
148. See United Nations and the Situation in Liberia, supra note 75, at 14. Further, the
military junta agreed to assist the multinational force in maintaining peace and security.
149. See id. at 1; see also S.C.Res 940, U.N. SCOR, 3413rd mtg., U.N.Doc. S/RES/940
(1994).
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not commit grave human rights violations (as did Hutus in Rwanda), and the
state did not collapse or slide into anarchy (as occurred in Liberia and So-
malia). Nonetheless, Security Council Resolution 940 may have been the
most aggressive resolution ever adopted. Perhaps, Resolution 940 best evi-
dences the international community's willingness to use military force to
avert violent conflict and defend democratic institutions.15 ° Certainly, the in-
ternational community had witnessed more than enough blood-shed in Libe-
ria, Iraq, Yugoslavia, Somalia and Rwanda. However, in Haiti, power was
handed over with little incident. The U.S.-led operation in Haiti was a clear
and perhaps unintended illustration of preventative humanitarian action, as
opposed to humanitarian intervention."' Yet, it does not appear that the
United Nations intended to set'a precedent in Haiti. Nonetheless, as the dis-
cussion below will illustrate, such a precedent was set.
F. The Central African Republic (CAR)
The case of the CAR is important to examine because similar to the
ECOWAS mission in Liberia, it was the second time that: (1) the whole of
the international community supported humanitarian intervention by a
group of states in a purely internal conflict; (2) the United Nations had co-
deployed forces with an operation already underway; and (3) the Security
Council retroactively authorized a unilateral intervention which entailed the
use of force, thus placing a retroactive de jure seal on the intervention. More
important however, the case of the CAR again evidences the international
community's acceptance of humanitarian intervention by groups of states
when a democratic regime has been violently and illegally dislodged.
Since April 18, 1996, the CAR has been shaken by a series of mutinies
orchestrated by members of the French trained Central African Armed
Forces, "stemming to a large extent from widespread public discontent over
social and economic problems exacerbated by prolonged non-payment of
salary arrears." '152 Many public servants, including members of the armed
forces, had been demanding payment of salary arrears from 1992.153 Ac-
cording to Premier Jean-Paul Ngoupande, the mutineers sought to over-
throw the government of President Ange-Felix Patasse.154
150. It would be a mistake not to factor in keen American pressure to take military
action in Haiti.
151. U.N. action in Haiti may have curtailed deadly conflict between the military
junta and pro-Aristide supporters.
152. Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Resolution 1136 (1997) Concerning
The Situation In The Central African Republic, U.N. SCOR, 53rd sess., U.N. Doc.
S/1998/61 (1998); See Central African Republic: Angel on a Pinhead, AFRICA
CONFIDENTIAL, May 10, 1996; CAR: Mutineers' Mistake, AFRICA CONFIDENTIAL, June 7,
1996; CAR: Echoes of Zaire, AFRICA CONFIDENTIAL, Nov. 29, 1996; CAR: French Fire,
AFRICA CONFIDENTIAL, Jan. 17, 1997; CAR: French Leave, AFRICA CONFIDENTIAL,
Oct. 10, 1997; Patasse's Problems, AFRICA CONFIDENTIAL, Mar. 6, 1998.
153. See Central African Republic: Angel on a Pinhead, supra note 152.
154. See CAR: Echoes of Zaire, supra note 152.
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France, said to have had 2500 legionnaires in the country, took the
leading role in quashing the mutinies.15 French troops are said to have used
Puma helicopters to launch a "furious retaliatory attack on rebel positions,"
killing more civilians than mutineers. 5 As a result, the French intervention
came under serious scrutiny in Paris, as "Defense Minister Charles Millon's
predecessor, Franqois Leotard, called for a parliamentary debate ... [and]
... Socialist leader Lionel Jospin said the secret defense pact with Bangui
was supposed to be activated only by external attack., 157 Amidst growing
pressure from Paris and President Patasse for a French withdrawal from the
CAR, in late September 1997, French troops began to depart.1 58
In late January 1997, pursuant to requests made by President Patasse at
the Nineteenth Summit of Heads of State and Government of France and
Africa, and following the Conference on Consensus-building and Dialog, the
Heads of State of Gabon, Burkina Faso, Chad and Mali established the In-
ter-African Mission to Monitor the Implementation of the Bangui Agree-
ments (MISAB).'- 9 On February 8, 1997, MISAB deployed 800 troops to the
CAR to restore peace and security and to "monitor the implementation of
the Bangui Agreements, and [to conduct] operations to disarm the former
rebels, the militia and all other unlawfully armed individuals."' 6 Under the
military command of Gabon and with logistical and financial support from
France and the Organization of African Unity, Burkina Faso, Chad, Gabon,
Senegal and Togo participated in the mission.
16
On August 6, 1997, the Security Council adopted Resolution 1125,
which deemed the situation in the CAR a threat to international peace and
security and authorized Member States participating in MISAB to take en-
forcement action to ensure the security and freedom of movement of their
personnel.162  The Security Council adopted three additional resolutions
which extended MISAB's mandate to take enforcement action to guarantee
the security and movement of its personnel.' 63
155. See CAR: Mutineers' Mistake, supra note 152, at June 7, 1996. This was the
fourth time that French troops have intervened to save Patasse's regime. See CAR: French
Leave, supra note 152.
156. See CAR: French Fire, supra note 152.
157. Although it would be beyond the scope of this article to discuss the legality of
France's intervention in the CAR, it appears not to have been justified under international
law. See id.
158. See id.
159. The Nineteenth Summit of Heads of State and Government of France and Af-
rica was held in Ouagadougou in December 1996; the Conference on Consensus-building
and Dialog was held in Bangui in mid-January 1997. See Report of the Secretary-General
Pursuant to Resolution 1136 (1997) Concerning The Situation In The Central African Re-
public, U.N. SCOR, 53rd sess., U.N. Doc. S/1998/61 (1998).
160. See id. Without intervention by MISAB, deadly conflict would have engulfed the
state.
161. See id.
162. See S.C. Res. 1125, U.N. SCOR, 3808th mtg., U.N.Doc. S/RES/1125 (1997).
163. See S.C. Res. 1152, U.N. SCOR, 3853rd mtg., U.N.Doc. S/RES/1152 (1998); S.C.
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On March 27, 1998, the Security Council adopted Resolution 1159 cre-
ating the United Nations' Mission in the Central African Republic
(MINURCA)," to assist in the maintenance of peace, security, law and or-
der, and protect key installations in Bangui; to monitor the disarmament
process; to ensure security and freedom of movement of U.N. personnel and
the safety and security of U.N. property; and to provide police training for
the national police and technical support to national electoral bodies. 65 The
Security Council mandated Secretary-General Kofi Annan to "secure a
smooth transition between MISAB and MINURCA by 15 April 1998.
' 66
Kofi Annan selected Oluyemi Adeniji, a Nigerian, to be his special represen-
tative to the CAR.167
The MISAB intervention in the CAR appears to have been legal be-
cause President Patasse was in de facto control of the state when he re-
quested external assistance, and the mission seems to have been carried out
in a neutral fashion. Some reports have suggested that MISAB was discred-
ited because it failed to disarm Patasse's loyalist militias, many of whom
"wearing MISAB insignia have plundered villages . . . . ,,.6' Nevertheless,
since the member states of MISAB took unilateral enforcement action with-
out authorization from the Security Council, the intervention would have to
be deemed unlawful under Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter, unless it can be
shown that they properly invoked a right to humanitarian intervention.
Although the mutinies spawned violent conflict between the Central
African Armed Forces, French legionnaires, and mutineer-rebels, it cannot
be said that there were wide spread human rights abuses of the type that
would justify humanitarian intervention. Nor did the fighting cause Patesse's
government to collapse, although it did fold to some degree, causing the
state to slide into a state of chaos.169 Likewise, the mutineers were not suc-
cessful at "fully" dislodging Patasse's democratically elected regime, an im-
portant prerequisite to humanitarian intervention. Therefore, since none of
the normative criteria discussed earlier appear to be satisfied, the MISAB
intervention would not appear to qualify as a lawful humanitarian interven-
tion.
Conversely, since Patasse's government was barely able to maintain law
and order,170 and due to the fact that continued fighting between loyal gov-
Res. 1136, U.N. SCOR, 3829th mtg., U.N.Doc. S/RES/1136 (1997); and S.C.Res. 1155,
U.N. SCOR, 3860th mtg., U.N.Doc. S/RES/1136 (1998).
164. Approximately 1350 personnel are supposed to participate in the mission. See
S.C. Res. 1159, U.N. SCOR, 3867th mtg., U.N.Doc. S[RES/1159 (1998).
165. See id.
166. Id.
167. See Nigerian Heads U.N. Mission In Central African Republic, PANAFRICAN
NEWS AGENCY, Apr. 7, 1998.
168. See CAR: French Leave, supra note 152.
169. Meaning that the government was almost overcome by successive revolts.
170. If Patasse's regime would have lost de facto control of the state or its ability (ab-
solute) to maintain law and order, international law would have forbade intervention by
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ernment forces and the military rebels had engulfed the country, MISAB
seems to have been entitled to intervene to forestall the fighting and avert
state collapse and absolute anarchy. 71 Moreover, as the above discussion
shows, the international community appears willing to condone intervention
to defend and safeguard democratic institutions. Whether such a right would
fit under the purview of the doctrine of humanitarian intervention or some
other norm of international law is unclear. As stated above, this would seem
to depend on how the civilian population of a state reacts to a challenge to
the regime in power, and based on this, whether the civilian population
would be threatened with death or suffering on a grand scale. As the above
discussion shows, any time the latter condition can be confirmed, state's
practice suggests that intervention is lawful when alleviating such conditions
(United Nations in Haiti and ECOWAS in Sierra Leone).
In conclusion, the case of the CAR represents the second instance in
which the Security Council has retroactively placed a de jure seal on a prior
unilateral intervention which entailed the use of force by a group of states,
and co-deployed forces with an operation already underway. Furthermore,
it was the second time that the whole of the international community sup-
ported unilateral humanitarian intervention by a group of states in a purely
internal conflict. Hence, in order to avert the consequences of civil war, the
case of the CAR taken together with the cases of Liberia and Haiti evidence
that the international community may condone humanitarian intervention by
groups of states when democratic governments are being violently and ille-
gally dislodged.
IV. ECOWAS AND THE CASE OF SIERRA LEONE: NEW
CRITERIA?
There is no question that the international community's responses to the
ECOWAS intervention in Sierra Leone were influenced by the actions of
ECOWAS in Liberia, MISAB in the CAR, the U.S. and allied operation in
Iraq, and U.N. action in Liberia, Somalia, Yugoslavia, Rwanda, Haiti, and
the CAR. Taken together, the above case studies evidence that, regardless
of the legal basis for intervention, humanitarian intervention by groups of
states, regional actors, or the United Nations in internal conflicts appears
lawful.
The ECOWAS intervention in Sierra Leone raises several legal ques-
tions, some of which parallel those discussed above and others which do
not.' Just as it had done in Liberia, ECOWAS militarily intervened in Si-
MISAB, as it would have interfered with the civilian populaces right to self-determination.
See Schachter, supra note 30, at 1641; see also Doswald-Beck, supra note 82, at 195-96.
171. It is estimated that several hundred civilians died in the fighting. See Car: Ech-
oes of Zaire, supra note 152.
172. This section will not include a detailed analysis of the events which led to the
conflict in Sierra Leone.
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erra Leone without U.N. authorization. 173 However, unlike the Liberian
case, it is unclear whether ECOWAS was entitled to invoke a right to hu-
manitarian intervention, although there is some evidence to support this no-
tion. Notwithstanding, it appears that ECOWAS can justify intervention on
other grounds.
The case of Sierra Leone further evidences the following points: (1) that
customary international law seems to recognize a right to unilateral humani-
tarian intervention by states or regional actors in internal conflicts; and (2)
that humanitarian intervention may be justified when a group of states or re-
gional actor attempts to restore democracy to a state which has been vio-
lently and illegally dislodged (or collapsed and is sliding into anarchy)
against the will of its populace, especially when a population is threatened
with death or suffering on a grand scale. This contention is supported by the
international community's support for the U.N. missions in Liberia, Somalia,
Rwanda, Haiti, the CAR, the interventions by ECOWAS in Liberia and Si-
erra Leone and the MISAB mission in the CAR. However, any invocation
of a right to humanitarian intervention to "defend" or "safeguard" democ-
racy would only seem permissible when the civilian population of a state is
threatened with death or suffering on a grand scale. Without the latter con-
dition, any intervention aimed at defending, safeguarding or restoring de-
mocracy as opposed to law and order would appear to fall outside the realm
of humanitarian intervention.
A.Background
In February and March of 1996, in the midst of a civil war, Sierra Leone
held its first parliamentary and presidential elections in thirty years.7 4 As a
result, the Sierra Leone Peoples Party led by President Ahmed Tijan Kab-
173. However, on October 8, 1997 the Security Council adopted Resolution 1132
which imposed an arms and petroleum embargo against the junta. The resolution also im-
posed travel restrictions against the junta and adult members of their families; ECOWAS
was sanctioned to enforce the embargo. See S.C. Res. 1132, U.N. SCOR, 3822nd mtg.,
U.N.Doc. S/RES/1132 (1997).
174. The election followed five years of civil war between the government of Sierra
Leone and the Revolutionary United Front. During the war, Sierra Leone's Military
Force, traditionally used for external defense, the national police force and civil defense
militias (Kamajors) provided internal security. The military force was supported by the
Nigerian and Guinean military. The government also employed Executive Outcomes, a
private South African mercenary firm. See Report of the Secretary-General on Sierra Le-
one, U.N. SCOR, 51st sess., U.N. Doc. S/1997/80 (1997). ECOWAS, the Organization of
African Unity, the United Nations, and numerous non-governmental organizations were
involved in setting the stage for the elections. See AFRICA RESEARCH BULLETIN, June
1997, at 12733; AFRICA RESEARCH BULLETIN, May 1997, at 12694; West Africa, A Coup
in Freetown, AFRICA RESEARCH BULLETIN, June 1997, at 887; ECOWAS Intervenes To
Restore Democracy, AFRICA TODAY, July/Aug. 1997, at 24; U.S. DEPARTMENT OF
STATE, BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS AND LABOR, SIERRA LEONE
COUNTRY REPORT ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES FOR 1996 (1997).
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bah came into power.175 In spite of the election, fighting between the Gov-
ernment of Sierra Leone and the Revolutionary United Front, which con-
tested the election, continued. On November 30, 1996, the Government of
C6te d'Ivoire, ECOWAS, 76 the United Nations, the Organization of African
Unity, and the Commonwealth States facilitated peace-talks which culmi-
nated into the Abidjan Accord, ending the civil war.
On May 25, 1997, approximately six months after the war, several junior
military officers led by Major Johnny Koromah successfully overthrew the
democratically elected government of President Kabbah, forcing him to flee
to Guinea. 7 Before fleeing, President Kabbah officially requested that Ni-
geria and ECOWAS intervene and restore him to power.'78
During the coup, in order to prevent a counter-offensive by the Nigerian
Forces Assistant Group (NIFAG) and ECOMOG, Koromah's forces tacti-
cally attacked both contingents.179 The coup appears to have been successful
due to complicity by NIFAG officers who unintentionally leaked informa-
tion revealing when there would be a change of NIFAG guard units with
other units stationed on the outskirts of Monrovia, Liberia.
The whole of the international community condemned the coup. is° For
example, during the Organization of African Unity Council of Ministers
sixty-sixth Ordinary Session in Harare, Zimbabwe in May, 1997, the Council
of Ministers decided that it "[s]trongly and unequivocally condemns, the
coup d'etdt... and calls for the immediate restoration of constitutional order
[and] appeals to the leaders of ECOWAS to assist the people of Sierra Le-
one to restore constitutional order to the country .. .."'81
175. See Report of the Secretary-General on Sierra Leone, supra note 174.
176. It is important to note that prior to and during the civil war in Sierra Leone,
ECOWAS maintained a military base there to carry-out peacekeeping operartions in Li-
beria during the civil war. See Tougher Measures Against Junta in Freetown, PANAFRICAN
NEWS AGENCY, Sept. 2, 1997.
177. President Kabbah believes that the military junta seized power in order to profit
from the country's rich supply of diamonds and gold. He accused the Revolutionary
United Front of deceiving the regular army into staging the coup. Kabbah Urges
ECOWAS Leaders To Restore Him To Power, PANAFRICAN NEWS AGENCY, Sept. 2,
1997.
178. See AFRICA RESEARCH BULLETIN, June 1997, supra note 174, at 12695; Kabbah
Urges ECOWAS Leaders To Restore Him To Power, supra note 177.
179. See ECOWAS Intervenes To Restore Democracy, supra note 174, at 24; AFRICA
RESEARCH BULLETIN, May 1997, supra note 174, at 12694. NIFAG was created pursuant
to the Status of the Forces Agreement (SOFA) between Nigeria and Sierra Leone. SOFA
is essentially a defense pact between the two countries under which Nigeria provides mili-
tary and security support to Sierra Leone. See Status of Forces Agreement, Between the
Government of the Federal Republic of Nigeria and The Government of the Republic of
Sierra Leone Concerning the Provision of Military and Security Assistance to the Republic
of Sierra Leone (1997) [hereinafter SOFA].
180. See U.S. Department of State Office of the Spokesman Press Statement, U.S.
Reaction to Coup in Sierra Leone, May 26, 1997; Statement by the President of the Security
Council, U.N. SCOR, 52d Sess., U.N. Doc. S/PRST/1997/29 (1997).
181. Organization of African Unity Council of Ministers sixty-sixth Ordinary Session
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Soon after the coup, and pursuant to its obligations under the Status of
Forces Agreement (SOFA), the Republic of Nigeria sent additional NIFAG
troops to Sierra Leone to restore law and order1 2 NIFAG was met with
strong resistance from the junta and the Revolutionary United Front, and
was forced to retreat. On August 30, 1997, during the 20th Summit of
ECOWAS in Abuja, Nigeria, ECOWAS officially mandated ECOMOG to
enforce sanctions against the junta and restore law and order to Sierra Le-
one.18 In support of ECOWAS efforts, on October 8, 1997 the Security
Council adopted Resolution 1132, which imposed an arms and petroleum
embargo and travel restrictions against the military junta. The resolution
sanctioned ECOWAS to enforce its terms.
On February 5, 1998, "responding to an attack by junta forces on [its]
position at Lungi, ECOMOG launched a military attack on the junta" which
led to its removal from power, and expulsion by force from Freetown on
February 12, 1998.l8 By early March 1998, "ECOMOG [had] established it-
self successfully across most of the country."' ' On March 10, 1998, President
Kabbah returned to Freetown to resume his position as Head of State of Si-
erra Leone." He was accompanied by General Sani Abacha, former Chair-
man of ECOWAS and Head of State of Nigeria; President Lansana Conteh,
Head of State of Guinea; President Alpha Oumar Konare, Head of State of
Mali; President Ibrahim Bare Mainassara, Head of State of Niger and the
Vice-President of Gambia.
On March 16, 1998, the Security Council adopted Resolution 1156
which terminated prohibitions on the sale or supply of petroleum and pe-
troleum products to Sierra Leone.1 87 On April 17, 1998, the Security Council
adopted Resolution 1162 which commended ECOMOG for restoring peace
to Sierra Leone and authorized "the deployment, with immediate effect, of
up to ten United Nations' military liaisons and security advisory personnel"
to assist ECOMOG in the "identification of the former combatant elements
to be disarmed and the design of a disarmament plan, as well as to perform
other related security tasks.' ' 8t Further, the resolution encouraged the Sec-
retary-General to "submit to the Security Council recommendations on the
28-30 May, 1997, Harare, Zimbabwe, Draft Decisions, CM/Draft/Dec.(LXVI) Rev. 1, at
18.
182. See AFRICA RESEARCH BULLETIN, June 1997, supra note 174, at 12734.
183. See Tougher Measures Against Junta in Freetown, PANAFRICAN NEWS AGENCY,
Sept. 2, 1997. However, in early August 1997, pursuant to requests by ECOWAS member
states, former Nigerian Head of State and ECOWAS Chairman General Sani Abacha ap-
pears to have issued an "executive directive" authorizing an economic blockade against
Sierra Leone to be enforced by ECOMOG.
184. Fourth Report of the Secretary-General on the Situation in Sierra Leone, U.N.
SCOR, 53d sess., U.N. Doc. S/1998/249 (1998).
185. Id.
186. See id.
187. See S.C. Res. 1156, U.N. SCOR, 3861st mtg., U.N.Doc. S/RES/1156 (1998).
188. S.C. Res. 1162, U.N. SCOR, 3872nd mtg., U.N.Doc. S/RES/1162 (1998).
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possible deployment... of United Nations' military personnel. '"1 89
Before discussing the legality of intervention in Sierra Leone, the fol-
lowing points must be made. First, before the coup, there were two separate
military contingents in Sierra Leone, NIFAG and ECOMOG. However, af-
ter the coup, both forces integrated, making it difficult to distinguish them.' 9°
Second, pursuant to SOFA, it was Nigeria and not ECOWAS who militarily
engaged the junta in an attempt to restore law and order to Sierra Leone.1 91
Last, it appears that many NIFAG troops were on "loan" from ECOMOG,
meaning that many Nigerian soldiers performed in a dual capacity, serving
both NIFAG 9 and ECOMOG.1 93
B. The Nigerian Intervention
As previously mentioned, immediately after the coup, in an attempt to
ward off hostile junta troops, NIFAG engaged the military junta. Both
NIFAG troops and Nigerian-ECOMOG troops assigned to NIFAG partici-
pated.
Unilateral intervention by Nigeria appears to have been lawful for three
reasons: (1) President Kabbah requested that Nigeria intervene to restore
democracy; (2) the SOFA between Nigeria and Sierra Leone permits inter-
vention in the event of an internal threat to the state; and (3) Nigeria was
obligated and permitted to intervene under the ECOWAS Revised Treaty of
1993.
International law recognizes the right of an incumbent government to
request military assistance from a third state in order to offset an illegal prior
intervention by another state.94 However, absent a defense pact (SOFA),
and claims of humanitarian intervention aside, international law does not
permit "forcible military intervention" by a third state in the purely internal
affairs of another state.95 In this context, wanting the above, Nigeria would
189. Id.
190. Since General Abacha was Head of State of Nigeria and Chairman of
ECOWAS, merging both contingents would not have been difficult.
191. See AFRICA RESEARCH BULLETIN, June 1997, supra note 174, at 12734; BBC
News World: Africa, ECOMOG: peacekeeper or participant?, Feb. 11, 1998; BBC News
World: Africa, Sierra Leone: key facts and figures, Feb. 10, 1998.
192. For reasons already stated, ECOMOG had approximately 4000 troops stationed
in Sierra Leone, the majority of which were Nigerian. See BBC News World: Africa,
ECOMOG: peacekeeper or participant?, supra note 191. In addition, pursuant to SOFA,
several hundred NIFAG troops were stationed there as well. See id.
193. For example, Major General Victor Malu served both as commander of
ECOMOG in Liberia and NIFAG in Sierra Leone. See West African Military Action In
Sierra Leone Yet To Start, PANAFRICAN NEWS AGENCY, June 6, 1997. He also was com-
mander of ECOMOG operations in Sierra Leone.
194. See Wippman, supra note 12, at 452; see also OSCAR SCHACHTER,
INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 160 (1991).
195. Yet, international law does not prohibit a third state from providing tangible
military assistance or advisors to offset an internal rebellion. See Wippman, supra note 12
1998]
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be unable to justify using NIFAG forces stationed in Sierra Leone or rein-
forcements to oust the junta and reinstate the de jure government to power.
However, since the SOFA between the two countries sanctioned inter-
vention, the intervention appears to have been lawful. According to the
terms of SOFA, "NIFAG shall have the right to apply force in the suste-
nance of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of Sierra
Leone."' 96 Hence, Nigeria-NIFAG troops were obliged to attempt to restore
stability to the Republic, and given the illegality and unpopularity of the
coup, create the conditions so that the de jure government could return to
power." From this view, Nigeria was justified in sending reinforcements and
using force to protect its citizens and fulfill its obligations under SOFA. In-
ternational law recognizes the right of sovereign states to protect the rights
of their citizens abroad. 198 For that reason, Nigeria seems to have been enti-
tled to send reinforcements to protect NIFAG soldiers and their families.
Moreover, Nigeria was justified in proportionately responding to repeated
attacks by junta forces on NIFAG "security stations" and personnel.1' 9
Finally, the ECOWAS Revised Treaty of 1993 seems to confirm the le-
gality of the Nigerian intervention." Under Article 58 of the Treaty, mem-
ber states "undertake to work to safeguard and consolidate relations condu-
cive to the maintenance of peace, stability and security within the region"
and pledge to "co-operate with the Community in establishing and strength-
ening appropriate mechanisms for the timely prevention and resolution of
intra-State and inter-State conflict .... ,"0' Moreover, Article 58 calls on
member states to "establish a regional peace and security observation system
and peace-keeping forces where appropriate." 2 2 Hence, according to the
Treaty, Nigeria was obligated to send peace-keeping forces to Sierra Leone
to restore law and order and prevent the state from descending into anarchy.
at 447; Doswald-Beck, supra note 82, at 251 (1986).
196. SOFA, Article 21.1.1 (1993), supra note 179.
197. Nevertheless, as stated above, had Sierra Leone been in the midst of a civil war
(such as was the case in Liberia), or it can be shown that Nigeria intervened solely to re-
move the junta from power, as opposed to restoring law and order, the intervention would
have violated international law. But, since no evidence has been forwarded to support
such a claim, and the junta was met with strong resistance from the civilian population, it
was not unable to provoke a civil war, hence, the de jure government was entitled to re-
quest outside assistance.
198. See R.N. Gardner, Commentary on the Law of Self-Defense, in LAW AND
FORCE IN THE INTERNATIONAL ORDER 49, 52 (Lori Fisler Damrosch & David Schaffer,
eds., 1991); R.B. Lillich, Forcible Protection of Nationals Abroad: The Liberian Incident of
1990, 35 GERMAN Y.B. INT'L L. 205 (1991); Louise Doswald-Beck, The Legality of the
U.S. Intervention in Grenada, 31 NETH. INT'L L. REV. 355, 361 (1984). Also, under SOFA,
supra note 179, Article 21.1.2, NIFAG was entitled to a right of self-defense.
199. See Nicaragua v. U.S.A., 1986 ICJ Rep. 14, at 94, 122-23.
200. See Economic Community of West African States Revised Treaty Art. 58 Re-
gional Security, 24 July 1993 [hereinafter ECOWAS Treaty].
201. Id. (emphasis added).
202. Id. (emphasis added).
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For the above stated reasons, the Nigerian intervention appears to have been
lawful. Moreover, the fact that the United Nations did not reprimand Nige-
ria for taking unilateral action lends credence to its validity.
C. The ECOWAS Intervention
The ECOWAS intervention in Sierra Leone seems to be justified on
several grounds, all of which fall within the purview of the generally recog-
nized exceptions to the principle of non-interference. Forcible military in-
tervention by ECOWAS appears to be justified for the following reasons: (1)
President Kabbah requested that ECOWAS intervene; (2) ECOWAS ap-
pears to have been entitled to invoke a right to humanitarian intervention;
(3) ECOWAS was permitted to intervene under the ECOWAS Revised
Treaty of 1993; (4) ECOWAS may have acquired the requisite legal status to
enable it to act as a de jure government; and (5) the Security Council retroac-
tively authorized the intervention.
As previously stated, under international law, an incumbent de jure re-
gime is entitled to request outside assistance (military equipment, but not
troop support) to quell internal disorder, as long as the disorder has not ma-
tured into civil war, and the rebels are not in de facto control of the state. 3
Therefore, considering the circumstances of this case, Kabbah was entitled to
request that ECOWAS introduce a peace-keeping force into Sierra Leone to
maintain law and order, and receive external military assistance.
Shortly after the coup, the situation in Sierra Leone became chaotic.
Yet, it cannot be said that the country was consumed by anarchy or that
there were mass violations of human rights warranting humanitarian inter-
vention. Still, the author contends that a claim to humanitarian intervention
may be justified because the de jure government had been illegally and vio-
lently dislodged against the will of the civilian population, who because of
their active opposition to the coup were threatened with death and suffering
on a grand scale. Moreover, civilian opposition to the coup by way of armed
resistance and nationwide employment strikes caused the states' basic infra-
structure to collapse. Without intervention by ECOMOG, fighting between
the junta, the Revolutionary United Front, and the Kamojors and other ci-
vilians loyal to President Kabbah would have continued to intensify, causing
untold death and destruction.20 4
Although the United Nations did not intend for the Haiti intervention
to serve as a viable precedent, it was no doubt an impetus for calls to restore
democracy in Sierra Leone. In fact, the events in Sierra Leone may impel
the international community to regard Haiti as a precedent by default. Since
there is no consensus as to whether international law recognizes a right to
democratic governance, states would seem pre-mature in exclusively justify-
ing intervention on such grounds. However, when a democratic government
203. See Doswald-Beck, supra note 82, at 194.
204. See AFRICAN RESEARCH BULLETIN, June 1997, supra note 174, at 12735.
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has been violently and illegally dislodged against the will and to the detri-
ment of its civilian population, current trends (United Nations/United States
in Haiti, MISAB in the CAR and ECOWAS in Sierra Leone) verify that
humanitarian intervention may be justified. Again, for such an intervention
to be lawful, the population would have to be threatened with death or suf-
fering on a grand scale, the case of Sierra Leone being the better example.
Paradoxically, the international community has demonstrated its will-
ingness to support forcible intervention in the internal affairs of states (Haiti,
the CAR and Sierra Leone) to safeguard democracy, without there being a
genuine threat to international peace and security. Moreover, in none of the
above cases did the junta commit human rights abuses so heinous as to vio-
late the jus cogens norms of international law, nor did any of the states slide
into anarchy. One explanation for this inconsistency may be that the inter-
national community is witnessing the development of a new norm of interna-
tional law, namely, the recognition of a right to democratic governance. Ac-
cording to Tes6n, Western nations have accepted the principle of democracy
as a rule which is fully enforceable by international law:
There can be little doubt that a principle of democratic rule is today
part of international law. While in a universal context the recogni-
tion of the principle has only had the effect of subtracting the ques-
tion of democratic rule from the exclusive jurisdiction of states, the
nations in Europe and the Americas have evaluated the principle of
democracy to the category of a rule which is full enforceable
through appropriate regional collective mechanisms.
The cases of ECOWAS in Sierra Leone and Liberia and MISAB in the
CAR demonstrate that many African states have also accepted the principal
of democracy as a rule enforceable through regional collective mechanisms.
As a result, in certain circumstances, international law today seems to recog-
nize the existence of a right to democratic governance as an exception to the
principle of non-intervention. However, such an exception would only ap-
pear lawful when, for example, undemocratic means are employed to unseat
a democratic government, and such an unseating threatens the stability of a
state and its domestic populace.' On this issue, U.N. Secretary-General Kofi
Annan stated, "Africa can no longer tolerate, and accept as fait accompli,
coups against elected governments, and the illegal seizure of power by mili-
tary cliques, who sometimes act for sectional interests, sometimes simply for
their own." 207 Although Kofi Anan's position may not reflect the thinking of
all of the member-states of the United Nations, it is unlikely that this is a mi-
205. Tes6n, supra note 4, at 335; see G.A. Res. 150, U.N. GAOR, 45th Sess., at 457-
59, U.N. Doc. A/RES/45/150 (1991).
206. Again, democratic institutions are those which enjoy unimpeded support from
the bulk of a state's populace. Hence, an "unelected" government which satisfies the
above criterion may still be democratic.
207. Secretary-General Pledges Support of United Nations in Helping Sierra Leone
Leave Behind Unfortunate Chapter in Country's History, U.N.P.R., 53rd sess., U.N. Doc.
SG/SM/6481 - AFR/44 (1998).
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nority view.
In this context, international law would not permit intervention by
states individually to restore or safeguard democracy, but alternatively, may
permit unilateral intervention by groups of states or regional actors. Cer-
tainly, international support for the interventions in Haiti, the CAR and Si-
erra Leone support this contention.
As previously mentioned, unlike the ECOWAS Treaty of 1975, the
ECOWAS Revised Treaty of 1993 permits its member states to establish a
regional peace-keeping force to resolve internal conflicts.2u8 That being the
case, and considering that Sierra Leone is a member of ECOWAS, the
community was justified in mandating ECOMOG to restore law and order
to Sierra Leone.
ECOWAS-ECOMOG may have acquired the requisite legal status to
entitle it to a right of self-defense. Since many ECOMOG soldiers func-
tioned in dual roles, serving both in NIFAG and ECOMOG,' they were in-
discriminately targeted by Koromah's junta. Thus, prior to Kabbah's request
that ECOWAS intervene to restore law and order, 210 ECOMOG troops and
the junta had already clashed.2 ' Accordingly, in consonance with the inter-
national right of self-defense, ECOMOG forces acted lawfully when they de-
fended themselves against the junta.1 2
ECOMOG appears to have had a two-tiered right of self-defense. First,
as mentioned above, under international law, ECOMOG troops were enti-
tled to protect themselves and community property. Consequently, they
were also fit to engage "unruly" junta forces which attempted to prevent
them from fulfilling their mandate. 3 Second, under international law, gov-
ernments have an inherent right to defend the states they represent, regard-
less of whether the threat is internal or external."' It is therefore unlikely
that a regional actor whose personnel and assets have been attacked by mili-
tary elements in a host state would be entitled to act as a de jure government
and quash the rebellion.
208. See ECOWAS Treaty, supra note 200.
209. See generally ECOWAS Treaty, supra note 200.
210. See AFRICA RESEARCH BULLETIN, June 1997, supra note 174, at 12694; Paul
Ejime, Kabbah Urges ECOWAS Leaders To Restore Him To Power, PANAFRICAN NEWS
AGENCY, Sept. 2,1997.
211. See AFRICA RESEARCH BULLETIN, June 1997, supra note 174, at 12695.
212. See Oscar Schachter, Authorized Uses of Force by the United Nations and Re-
gional Organizations, in LAW AND FORCE IN THE NEW INTERNATIONAL ORDER, supra
note 198, at 83, 84-89.
213. See id. at 84. As noted earlier, ECOMOG maintained a military base in Sierra
Leone and therefore did not need to enter or intervene in Sierra Leone in the physical
sense. Nor did it need Sierra Leone's consent to impose and enforce economic sanctions.
However, ECOWAS did need consent from the de jure government to intervene to re-
store law and order. Humanitarian justifications aside, if Kabbah had not requested assis-
tance from ECOWAS, the intervention by ECOMOG would have been unlawful.
214. See ECOWAS Treaty, supra note 200.
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Under international law, regional actors are not considered to have an
independent legal personality, and therefore may not claim or invoke the
same rights as states. 5 Stated differently, regional actors may not possess
any powers not granted to them by their members, and states may not confer
powers they do not maintain. Nonetheless, international law is silent on the
issue of whether a regional actor could "acquire" the requisite legal person-
ality to entitle it to act as a government. In the case of Sierra Leone,
ECOWAS may have attained the requisite legal personality. Here, the junta
leadership was aware that ECOMOG would attempt to quell the coup, and
as a result strategically attacked ECOMOG headquarters and troops. The
junta was no doubt threatened by ECOMOG's presence, as ECOMOG
maintained enough military might to thwart the coup. In this sense, both the
de jure government and ECOMOG were targeted by the junta. Furthermore,
ECOMOG could not rely on the Armed Forces of Sierra Leone to protect it,
since it was the very group that staged the revolt.
After the coup, ECOMOG and NIFAG troops stationed in Sierra Le-
one quickly set up key posts around Freetown, in effect limiting the junta's
sphere of influence. ECOMOG was the only de facto authority, as it con-
trolled more territory than Koromah's rebels and was the only entity capable
of restoring and maintaining law and order. ECOMOG functioned as ex of-
ficio state administrator, 216 mediator, and peace-enforcer. Taken together,
the above facts suggest that by August 1997, ECOMOG may have developed
the requisite legal personality to entitle it to act as a quasi-de jure govern-
ment and to take all necessary measures to restore constitutional order to
the state.
Although the Security Council did not authorize ECOWAS-ECOMOG
to take enforcement action, it supported forcible intervention by
ECOWAS On October 8, 1997, two months after the ECOWAS inter-
vention, the Security Council adopted Resolution 1132. The resolution
stated "that all States shall prevent the sale or supply to Sierra Leone, by
their nationals or from their territories, or using their flag vessels or aircraft,
of petroleum and petroleum products and arms and related materiel of all
types, including weapons and ammunition, military vehicles and equipment,
paramilitary equipment., 218 In addition, it imposed travel restrictions on
members of the "military junta and adult members of their families," to pre-
vent them from fleeing the state.2' 9 The resolution sanctioned ECOWAS to
"ensure [its] strict implementation i.e. enforce compliance."220
215. See generally Schachter, supra note 212, at 87-88.
216. The junta did not receive official recognition from any state because the interna-
tional community recognized Kabbah's government as the de jure authority of Sierra Le-
one. See AFRICAN RESEARCH BULLETIN, June 1997, supra note 174, at 12733-35.
217. See U.N. SCOR, 3798th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/PRST/1997/36 (1997).
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Five years after co-deploying forces with ECOMOG in Liberia, and
several months after the MISAB intervention, Resolution 1132 demonstrates
that, in certain circumstances, the United Nations and the international
community support and, in certain instances, encourage unilateral humani-
tarian intervention by groups of states and regional actors in purely internal
conflicts. The Sierra Leone case represents the fifth instance (the other four
being Liberia, Somalia, Haiti and the CAR) in which the Security Council
has deemed an indisputably internal conflict a threat to international peace
and security.22' Just as Security Council Resolution 788 appears to have
placed a retroactive de jure seal on the ECOWAS intervention in Liberia,
and Resolution 1125 on the MISAB intervention in the CAR, Resolution
1132 seems to have done the same in Sierra Leone.
In addition, Security Council Resolution 1162 marked the first time
that the United Nations co-deployed (UNOMIL) with a peace-keeping op-
eration already set up by another organization (ECOMOG-Liberia) 22' To
the extent that the cases of Liberia and the CAR can be used as an indicator
of future events, it is probable that the United Nations will co-deploy mili-
tary personnel with ECOMOG in Sierra Leone. Yet, depending on the
scope of the duties presently being performed by the U.N. "military liaison"
and "security advisory personnel" in Sierra Leone, such a co-deployment
may already be underway.
V. CONCLUSION
As the above discussion delineates, today's customary international law
appears to permit humanitarian intervention by groups of states or regional
actors in internal conflicts in three instances: (1) when human rights abuses
are so grave that the jus cogens norms of international law have been vio-
lated; (2) when a state has collapsed and is sliding into a state of anarchy;
224
and (3) to safeguard democracy when a democratic government has been
violently and illegally dislodged against the will of its civilian population.
Taken together, the above case studies demonstrate that today, in cer-
tain instances, the international community has accepted the principle of
unilateral humanitarian intervention. As a result, there can be no question
that the customary international law doctrine of humanitarian intervention
survived the post U.N. era. In addition, the fact that the Security Council
221. See S.C. Res. 1132, U.N. SCOR, 3822th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1132 (1997) (de-
termining that the situation in Sierra Leone constituted a threat to international peace and
security within the region).
222. See S.C. Res. 1162, U.N. SCOR, 3872d mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1162 (1997).
While authorizing the deployment of U.N. military liaison and security advisory personnel
to Sierra Leone, and expressing its intention to consider proposals for the deployment of
U.N. military personnel, this resolution shadowed Security Council Resolution 866, con-
cerning Liberia. See S.C. Res. 866, U.N. SCOR, 3281st mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/866 (1993).
223. See S.C. Res. 866, U.N. SCOR, 3281st mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/866 (1993).
224. See Schachter, supra note 212, at 88.
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has been used as a mechanism to "countersign" unilateral humanitarian in-
tervention on three separate occasions (Liberia, the CAR and Sierra Leone)
renders moot arguments to the contrary.
Clearly, the international community has demonstrated its willingness to
entrust certain peace-enforcement missions to regional actors. And, as veri-
fied by the overwhelming support for the ECOWAS missions in Liberia and
Sierra Leone and the MISAB intervention in the CAR, the international
community seems eager to have African states take a leading role in the pre-
vention, management and resolution of African conflicts.25 This is particu-
larly true in the case of South Africa, which will take an undoubtedly more
active role in enforcing the peace in the future as it asserts itself as a regional
hegemon. Perhaps this explains why the interventions in Liberia, Sierra Le-
one, and the CAR met with little controversy, resistance, and scrutiny by the
international community.
As Schachter asserts, "[i]t is probable that peacekeeping actions and
perhaps limited enforcement will be employed by regional organizations
more frequently in the future ... [and be used] ... to provide order to a
country in internal conflict or near-anarchy. '2 6 This assertion is best sup-
ported by requests from the United Nations that regional organizations take
a more active role in the maintenance of international peace and security.227
For example, U.N. General Assembly Resolution 49/57 of December 9,
1994, "encourages regional arrangements and agencies to consider ways and
means to promote closer cooperation and coordination with the United Na-
tions, in particular in the fields of preventive diplomacy, peacemaking and
post-conflict peace-building, and, where appropriate, peace-keeping. ''28
The ECOWAS and MISAB interventions demonstrated that Africans
225. This was the impetus behind the creation of the U.S.-led African Crisis Re-
sponse Initiative, which was created to enhance African peacekeeping and humanitarian
relief capacity by providing training and equipment (primarily communications) to Afri-
can countries where the military accepts the supremacy of democratic civilian government
and where there is a commitment to peacekeeping. The primary goal of the initiative is to
create rapidly-deployable, interoperable units from stable and democratic countries.
Other states, such as Britain, France, Belgium and the Nordic states, provide this training.
To date, Senegal, Uganda, Malawi, Ethiopia, Mali and Ghana have partaken in the train-
ing. See United States Department of State, African Crisis Response Initiative InterAgency
Working Group Fact Sheet (1997); see also Jeremy Levitt, The African Crisis Response
Initiative: A General Survey, 28 AFRICA INSIGHT (1998).
226. See Schachter, supra note 212, at 88.
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WORK OF THE ORGANIZATION 1996, at 306 (1996); UNITED NATIONS, CONFRONTING
NEW CHALLENGES: ANNUAL REPORT ON THE WORK OF THE ORGANIZATION 1995, at
38-39 (1995) [hereinafter CONFRONTING NEW CHALLENGES]; UNITED NATIONS, AN
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can and are becoming more efficient at managing conflict in Africa. Ac-
cording to Herbert Howe, in Liberia alone, the ECOWAS military leader,
has suffered perhaps six hundred killed in action and spent perhaps
a billion dollars, above normal operating costs, on a conflict that
did not directly affect its own security, at a time when its 1995 for-
eign debt stood at $35 billion. No Western nation, especially fol-
lowing the Somalian intervention, could match such commitment.2 2 9
ECOWAS has strongly contributed to spurring what appears to be new
norms of customary international law, specifically with regard to the doctrine
of humanitarian intervention. Taken together, the ECOWAS, MISAB, and
U.N. interventions demonstrate a consistent pattern of commonality in ac-
tion among states. This commonality evidences that there has been a shift in
the law de lege ferenda, permitting unilateral humanitarian intervention by
groups of states and regional actors in internal conflicts.
229. Herbert Howe, Lessons of Liberia: ECOMOG and Regional Peacekeeping, in
NATIONALISM AND ETHNIC CONFLICT 419-20 (Michael E. Brown, ed., 1997).

